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A B S T R A C T
This article addresses the question of how planners’ use and non-use of expert knowledge affect the
content and goal achievement potential of plans, and discusses how changes in planners’ and
researchers’ practices can contribute to improving goal achievement potential. These are questions that
have been given surprisingly little attention in planning research. Although interesting discussions have
emerged over recent years, few empirical studies have been presented. This article presents theory-
based empirical research on these issues based on analyses of strategic land-use and transport planning
processes in three Scandinavian cities where an aim is to limit or reduce trafﬁc volumes and greenhouse
gas emissions of transport. This is a highly relevant issue when analysing the effects of planners’ use and
non-use of expert knowledge. Goal achievement potential refers to whether plans (if implemented)
contribute to achieving deﬁned objectives, which in this paper mainly regards curbing or reducing urban
trafﬁc volumes. The expert knowledge in question concerns how land-use and transport systems
development inﬂuence trafﬁc volumes in urban regions.
The article concludes that whether planners use the expert knowledge in question or not, and how
they use it, do affect the goal achievement potential of the plans they produce. This knowledge is the
main basis for many planners’ knowing and acting. Planners use it to understand, explain and argue for
how and why coordination is necessary, and for selecting trafﬁc-reducing measures. All examined plans
also include strategies and measures that reduce their goal achievement potential, and non-use of the
expert knowledge is an important part of the explanation as to how and why this is the case. When
competing objectives seem to call for trafﬁc-increasing measures, planners tend not to take account of
expert knowledge in explaining that these measures reduce the goal achievement potential of plans, and
they do not turn to it for ﬁnding innovative ways of solving their planning problems. Instead, they rely on
their embedded professional knowledge, which is sometimes outdated or misleading. In other cases,
planners disregard the knowledge because it challenges planning agendas or compelling ideas, or they
exercise self-censorship when ﬁnding that it conﬂicts with political agendas.
Considerable effort is required in ensuring higher goal achievement potential in future plans. Planners
need to be more critical of their own tacit knowledge, and turn more actively to research-based
knowledge. Researchers need to produce the knowledge planners need in ways that are useful and
usable for them.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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4.0/).1. Introduction
In this paper we investigate how planners’ use and non-use of
expert knowledge in planning processes affect the goal achieve-
ment potential of plans. It contributes with theory-based empirical
investigations of how planners gain knowledge of the subjecte under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/
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Fig. 1. Planners use various kinds of knowledge when producing knowledge in the
form of analyses, plans and recommendations. Decision-makers are supposed to use
this knowledge, together with other kinds of knowledge, to improve their ability to
make decisions contributing to achievement of their objectives. The darker boxes and
arrows indicate the focus in this paper (ﬁgure based on Tennøy, 2012).
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knowledge when making plans; and whether and how this affects
the goal achievement potential of the resulting plans. This also
includes analyses of how and why planners include measures and
strategies which, according to state-of-the-art knowledge in the
ﬁeld, counteract goal achievement. Here, we combine structural
and causal analyses with readings in planning theory when
developing theoretical hypotheses or explanations. We critically
examine these explanations in empirical case studies of strategic
planning processes concerning land-use and transport develop-
ment in three Scandinavian cities where an aim is to limit or reduce
trafﬁc volumes and greenhouse gas emissions. Finally, we discuss
how both planning and research practices need to change if the
goal achievement potential of plans is to improve. Along with
several authors who discuss knowledge in planning, we agree with
Rydin (2007:53), who deﬁnes knowledge as differing from
information and data ‘‘in that the speciﬁcation of causal relationship
is central to knowledge’’. Goal achievement potential refers to
whether the plans (if implemented) contribute to achievement of
deﬁned goals.
A main hypothesis in this work is that research-based expert
knowledge and skilled planners applying this knowledge when
making analyses, appraisals and plans, are important prerequisites
for plans with high goal achievement potential. Hence, properties
of the relevant expert knowledge, the planners, and the practices of
the planners could also be part of the might also be part of the
explanation why planning processes produce plans with low goal-
achievement potential. This is in line with an understanding that
the aim of planning is to bring knowledge into decision-making, in
order to improve decision-makers’ abilities to make decisions
about future actions contributing to achieving their objectives
(Faludi, 1973; Friedmann, 1987), and that planners are main
carriers of knowledge of the subject matter dealt with in many
planning processes. This approach may be understood mistakenly
as belonging in a positivist epistemology, where presumably
neutral and objective scientiﬁc knowledge ‘‘translates straightfor-
wardly into the substance of policy’’ (Owens, Rayner, & Bina, 2004).
This is often contrasted with communicative or collaborative
planning (Healey, 1992), where transparency, inclusiveness and
deliberation are main issues. Based on our understanding of how
planning processes normally proceed, we ﬁnd it reasonable to
combine these approaches.
Our understanding is that planning processes (to varying
degree) are deliberative processes, where a (varying) number of
actors contribute in different ways. Professional planners are
important actors in these processes, as process leaders and as
knowledge carriers, users and producers. A main contribution of
planners should (as we understand it) be to bring research-based
expert knowledge concerning substantive case matters relevant
for the planning problem in hand to the planning discussions. By
asking questions such as ‘what should we do in order to . . .?’, and
‘what are the consequences of . . .?’, and applying relevant expert
knowledge when answering these questions – in dialogue with
other actors – planners can contribute to ﬁnding ways of solving
problems, reaching agreements and achieving deﬁned objectives.
In these ways they can also contribute with ex ante assessments of
positive and negative consequences of proposed projects or
strategies. Such assessments are necessary in order to understand
what is at stake in conﬂicts between different interest groups
(Næss, Hansson, Richardson, & Tennøy, 2013), and could hence be a
contribution to transparent, inclusive and deliberative planning
processes. As numerous authors have discussed (see Owens et al.
(2004) for a summary), planners do not necessarily use knowledge
and analyses in this way.
Planners’ use and non-use of expert knowledge in planning
processes, and how this affects the content and goal-achievementpotential of plans being their outcome, have received surprisingly
little attention in planning research and theory, as pointed out by
several authors (see, for instance, Davoudi, 2006; Krizek, Forsyth, &
Slotterback, 2009; Mazza, 2002). Interesting discussions concern-
ing these issues have emerged over the past decade (Friedmann,
2003; Krizek et al., 2009; Næss, 2004; Owens, Petts, & Bulkeley,
2006), with several authors calling for theory-based empirical
studies (Krizek et al., 2009; Næss, 2004; Owens, 2005; Owens et al.,
2004). One aim of this present paper is to respond to such calls; a
second is to discuss how both planning and research practice might
change in ways that contributed to the higher goal achievement
potential of plans.
Hence, the overall research questions in this article are: (1) How
do planners’ use and non-use of expert knowledge affect the
contents of plans and their goal achievement potential? (2) What
can be done to improve the goal achievement potential of plans?
In order to answer these broadly formulated main research
questions, we deﬁned four interrelated sub-questions which we
answer for each case: (i) Through what mechanisms is the expert
knowledge in question introduced in planning processes? (ii)
Through what mechanisms is this knowledge used in ways that
increase the goal achievement potential of plans? (iii) Through
what mechanisms are counter-productive measures with respect
to deﬁned objectives included in plans? (iv) How and to what
extent have planners’ use and non-use of the expert knowledge in
question affected the goal achievement potential of the plan?
1.1. Different kinds of knowledge are necessary in planning
As emphasised by a number of authors (Flyvbjerg, 2001; Healey,
1992, 2009; Krizek et al., 2009; Owens et al., 2006; Rydin, 2007),
various kinds and forms of knowledge from a number of sources
are normally used by planners when making plans. We distinguish
between expert knowledge, knowledge of the project and/or
objectives, process knowledge, knowledge of context, and other
types of knowledge (as illustrated in Fig. 1). Planners apply all of
these when they produce knowledge in the form of alternatives,
analyses, plans and recommendations meant to be used by
politicians in their decision-making, together with other kinds
of knowledge.
Process knowledge includes knowledge about laws, regulations
and procedures of planning and decision-making deﬁned in
planning legislation; knowledge about how to carry out planning
processes; knowledge about public participation in planning
processes, and so on (see, among others, Healey, 1992, 2009).
Planners are supposed to be trained in and to possess this kind of
knowledge, which includes the necessary professional skills of
listening, interpreting, mediating and negotiating (Forester, 1989).
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planning process is also necessary when making plans. Previously,
this knowledge was often assumed to be provided by the planners’
employers, who were developers or political decision-makers.
However, as discussed in current planning theory, it is often
produced as part of the planning process in dialogue with a number
of actors, often with the strong inﬂuence of the professional
planners involved (Healey, 2009; Rydin, 2007; Tennøy, 2010).
Knowledge regarding the speciﬁc context of the planning and the
project is an absolute prerequisite. This includes knowledge of
several issues – physical, political and cultural contexts, existing
plans and policies, current situation and trends, political objec-
tives, and so forth (see also Rydin, 2007) – which is collected from
sources such as statistics, existing plans, political signals in various
forms, communications with interested and involved parties,
businesses and local residents, or the users of areas (Fischer &
Forester, 1993; Healey, 1992, 2009).
Expert knowledge here is the theoretical knowledge of cause–
effect relations; empirical knowledge on whether, how and with
what strength certain actions have caused certain effects in various
contexts, as well as methodological knowledge for analysing which
effects certain actions can be expected to produce in the speciﬁc
context and time horizon dealt with in a speciﬁc planning process.
Planners are assumed to be trained in and to possess such
knowledge within their disciplines in order to be recognised as
professional planners (as understood in this work). Still, there will
be huge variations in how knowledgeable different planners are
within speciﬁc topics; for instance, integrated land-use and
transport planning. The expert knowledge may be understood as
the basis on which planners can approach, understand and deal
with the concrete planning problems they face in their practice
(Scho¨n, 1983). In order to distinguish between the knowledge
planners use when making plans and the knowledge they produce
(analyses, plans), the knowledge planners produce is not termed
expert knowledge in this work.
The above description illustrates how various types and sources
of knowledge are necessary when making plans, including expert
knowledge. Furthermore, even if the primary focus of this paper is
the role, use and inﬂuence of expert knowledge, we recognise other
kinds of knowledge as necessary and useful as well.
1.2. Situating our understanding of the role of expert knowledge in
planning
Understandings of the role, use and inﬂuence of expert
knowledge in planning have shifted over time. The different
understandings are closely related to changing ideas on the
possibilities of planning and governing, democracy and democratic
practice, and the perceived problems to hand. Debates have
revolved around topics such as the kinds of knowledge that are
relevant; which and whose knowledge is valid; who deﬁnes which
knowledge is valid; whether predictive knowledge is possible; and
how predictions could be made and understood.
1.2.1. Lack of focus on expert knowledge
A main impression from readings published over recent
decades, however, is that planning theory does not deal much
with expert knowledge on concrete issues planning deals with, the
role of such knowledge in planning processes and how it affects the
content of plans. When searching in often referred to readers
(Campbell & Fainstein, 2003; Faludi, 1973; Fischer & Forester,
1993) and in much referred to works in planning theory (Flyvbjerg,
1998; Friedmann, 1987; Healey, 1997; Hull, 2005, 2008; Stead &
Meijers, 2009), the absence of debate explicitly addressing expert
knowledge and planners’ use of this knowledge when making
plans and analyses is striking. In Allmendinger’s (2002) typology,this kind of knowledge seems to be classiﬁed as ‘exogenous
theories’.
Several authors have claimed that the strong focus on process
and deliberation in planning theory in previous decades has led to
a detachment of planning theory from the subjects with whom
planning dealing with (Krizek et al., 2009; Mazza, 2002; Næss,
2001). In the 1980s and 1990s, Davoudi (2006:22) found,
‘‘[a]ttention moved away from developing the substantive evidence
base of planning about how cities function (knowing what) to
developing new ideas, such as communicative planning, about the
process of planning (knowing how)’’.
Recent planning theory hence seems mainly to be about theory
of planning and less about theories in planning (Faludi, 1973;
Friedmann, 2003). Moreover, the literature of planning seems to
focus very little on the planners and how they act and interact
when applying expert knowledge on various substantive matters
in planning analyses, or on how this affects the content and goal
achievement potential of the resultant plans.
1.2.2. Negative understandings of the role of expert knowledge
Literature actually dealing with expert knowledge in planning
is often negative, suggesting that its inﬂuence is low or should be
reduced, or that such knowledge is not possible. Krizek et al.
(2009:460) came to a similar conclusion, claiming that ‘‘planning
theory has been absorbed with critiquing expert and scientiﬁc
knowledge, celebrating local and community knowledge, or pointing
out the political nature of planning’’.
One reason may be that authors distance themselves from
ideals of ‘extreme instrumental rationality’ dating back to the
1950s and 1960s. According to Banﬁeld (1959), examples of
planning practised this way were hard to ﬁnd even in the 1950s
and have probably never been common practice in public planning.
Owens et al. (2004:1950) did not ‘‘ﬁnd many theorists or
practitioners of conventional forms of appraisal adhering to the
technical-rational model in extreme form’’. Some researchers argue
that economic – rational transport models and optimising cost–
beneﬁt analyses are examples of applied instrumental rationality
(see Næss, 2006b or Willson, 2001 for critical discussions).
Another explanation could be the communicative or collabora-
tive turn in planning theory. Here, an ideal is that actors develop
objectives and knowledge in collaborative and transparent
processes, where ‘‘knowledge is not pre-formulated but is speciﬁcally
created anew in our communication’’ (Healey, 1992:153). There is
ongoing debate concerning whether this is a useful approach (see
Rydin, 2007). Owens and Cowell (2002:167) ﬁnd that ‘‘dialogue
may be a good way of dealing with purely local issues, but in the
context of sustainability these are probably rare, because many
processes shaping economic and environmental change operate at a
much broader scale’’.
Third, there is the discussion on whether there actually can
exist general knowledge on how, for instance, developments of
land-use and transport systems affect travel behaviour and trafﬁc
volumes (Batty, 2006; Flyvbjerg, 1998, 2001; Skjeggedal, Nordtug,
Wollan, & Ystad, 2003; Portugali, 2008). This could be related to the
understanding that one cannot produce accurate and certain
predictions in social science, because what actually happens in a
concrete situation in an open system will always be context-
dependent (Danermark, Ekstro¨m, Jakobsen, & Karlsson, 2002;
Sayer, 1992).
1.2.3. Evolving debates on the necessity of expert knowledge
Other authors argue that expert knowledge, as well as planners
applying the expert knowledge in planning, is necessary and
useful. Scho¨n (1983:309) states: ‘‘A most important kind of research
has to do with the methods of inquiry and the overarching theories of
phenomena, from which practitioners may develop on-the-spot
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knowledge transfer, so that ‘sound science’ impacts upon the world of
policy, has become almost ubiquitous’’. In her discussion and
typology of knowledge claims, Rydin (2007:64) lists ‘‘theoretically
framed expert research on the future informed by experiential
knowledge where appropriate’’ as predictive knowledge. Næss
et al. (2013) argue that we may now be seeing the beginnings of an
ontological turn in planning theory towards a stronger focus on the
concrete subjects that planning deals with, without turning the
back to the insights brought by process-oriented planning
research.
1.2.4. How the role of expert knowledge is understood in this work
Underlying and fundamental assumptions in this work are that
changes in the physical environment do affect aggregate-scale
human behaviour in relatively predictable ways, and for rational
and explainable reasons (Næss, 2015). The appropriate predictions,
however, are of a ‘soft’ nature, since the causal relationships are
tendencies, not deterministic regularities. They should be consid-
ered as being of a possibilistic and probabilistic nature. There can
and indeed does exist theoretical and empirical knowledge about
many of these cause–effect relationships. This knowledge is
continuously evolving and is fallible, as is all knowledge. In order
to take planning and development of the built environment
systematically in directions contributing to achieving deﬁned
goals, planners need to possess relevant expert knowledge
concerning which developments contribute to this (and not),
and use it when making plans.
Various forms of knowledge interplay in planning processes.
Sager (1994) emphasises that interactions between professionals
and non-professionals, requiring communication as well as
calculation, are needed in planning processes. Fischer and Forester
(1993) see planning as an argumentative practice, where analyses
produced by experts applying their expert knowledge on concrete
and contextual problems may be understood as arguments in a
larger debate over planning and policy issues. Rydin (2007) sees
planners as co-producers of knowledge when making plans and
expert knowledge as one of several types of knowledge necessary.
In line with these authors, we understand planning processes as
deliberative, and expert knowledge as one kind of knowledge
necessary in the processes.
This also means that even if expert knowledge exists and is
possessed by planners involved in a planning process, there is no
guarantee that it is inﬂuential or that plans produced have high
goal achievement potential. Planners may not introduce the
relevant expert knowledge in the planning processes, and if they
do it may be overruled by other kinds of knowledge or ousted.
1.3. Studying processes of strategic land-use and transport planning
In our empirical research, we study planners’ use and non-use
of expert knowledge in strategic and integrated land-use and
transport planning processes in cities whose aim is reduction of
trafﬁc volumes and GHG emissions from transport. We ﬁnd this
issue highly interesting and relevant, for several reasons.
One reason is that changing practices to ways that result in
planning and plans steering land-use and transport systems
developments in directions fostering more sustainable mobility
patterns is a major challenge for planning practitioners in many
cities and countries. Land-use and transport systems development
are, to a large extent, under the control of public authorities and
political decision-makers, through planning and decision-making
processes under the Planning and Building Act (PBA) or similar, and
through public planning and funding of transport infrastructure
and public transport services. According to research-based
knowledge, the spatial structure of an urban region – togetherwith the absolute and relative qualities of transport systems for
cars, public transport, cycling and walking – greatly affects
transport demand and modal split (Banister, 2008, 2012; Cairns,
Hass-Klau, & Goodwin, 1998; Newman & Kenworthy, 1989; Næss,
2006a, 2012). Steering developments of land-use and transport
systems in directions contributing to reduce transport demand and
trafﬁc volumes is a prominent objective in many planning and
policy documents (e.g. European Commission (EC), 2011; Norwe-
gian Ministry of Transport & Communications, 2013; Municipality
of Lund, 2010; UN Habitat, 2013). Still, land-use and transport
systems are being developed in ways contributing to increased
trafﬁc volumes in Norway (Ofﬁce of the Auditor General of Norway,
2007; Furu, 2010), the rest of Europe (EEA, 2001, 2007) as well as in
other countries worldwide (Banister, 2011; Owens & Cowell,
2002). In the EU, transport is the least successful sector in reducing
GHG emission targets (EEA, 2014; EC, 2011).
Second, developing land-use and transport systems in ways that
reduce transport demand and trafﬁc volumes is a complex
problem, and cause–effect relations are often not intuitively
obvious (we return to this in Section 3). Hence, if planners are to
develop innovatory and efﬁcient ways of achieving this goal, and to
assess whether proposed actions contribute to goal achievement,
they need to possess and use research-based expert knowledge
when making analyses and plans.
Third, transitions towards more environmentally sustainable
land-use and transport planning and plans require fundamental
change in framing and practice. New objectives and new
knowledge incorporating and giving priority to environmental
considerations need to replace or ﬁnd a place alongside existing
and established knowledge and objectives. Moreover, urban land-
use and transport planning are multi-disciplinary by nature, with
multiple kinds and forms of knowledge, from different sources,
being brought into the process (Hull, 2008; Næss, 2015; Petts,
Owens, & Bulkeley, 2008). This may result in conﬂicting objectives
and clashes of knowledge in planning processes: between and
within policy areas; between and within professions; between
older and newer understandings; as well as between the scientiﬁc
state-of-the-art, applied practices and politics (Flyvbjerg, 1998;
Owens, 1995; Tennøy, 2009, 2010, 2012).
A fourth reason is that strategic and integrated land-use and
transport planning processes are complex. Actors from different
sectors and levels are involved: private and public initiators of
plans and projects, planning authorities, public authorities and
other stakeholders entitled to comment on plans, political bodies
at the national, regional and local level and the wider public. They
enter planning processes with different objectives, knowledge and
power, and they participate in order to achieve what they see as the
most important (Tennøy, 2012). Hence, real and fundamental
conﬂicts are often embedded in processes, the stakes may be high,
and some actors will gain and others actors lose from whatever
decision is made (Flyvbjerg, 1998). In this perspective, planning
and decision-making processes can be understood as arenas for
settling conﬂicts, which does not necessarily mean arriving at
consensus. For such reasons, power is an unavoidable topic when
analysing how planners’ use and non-use of expert knowledge
affect the goal achievement potentials of plans. Hajer (1995) ﬁnds
that discourses frame certain problems by emphasising some
aspects of situations rather than others. In Flyvbjerg’s (2004:293)
words, ‘‘power produces knowledge and knowledge produces power’’.
Whether and how actors involved in the planning processes exert
the power they possess can greatly affect the processes and their
outcomes, as demonstrated by, among others, Flyvbjerg (1998),
Næss (2011a), Richardson (2005) and Tennøy (2012). In line with
this, we assume that whether and how planners use expert
knowledge can inﬂuence and be inﬂuenced by how the actors
involved (including the planners) exert the powers they possess.
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planning process, which in turn will vary with person and context.
The expert knowledge in question includes theoretical under-
standings of the causal mechanisms through which changes in
land-use and transport systems contribute to changes in travel
behaviour and trafﬁc volumes; empirical evidence concerning how
certain developments have contributed to concrete changes in
trafﬁc volumes in concrete contexts, and methods for applying
theoretical and empirical knowledge in combination with contex-
tual knowledge when analysing how land-use and transport
systems ought to develop if they are to contribute to reduced trafﬁc
volumes. Such knowledge is not understood as context-indepen-
dent knowledge that can deliver quantitative, certain and accurate
predictions. In particular, it is not to understood as quantitative
cost–beneﬁt analyses or the like. A brief overview of the authors’
understandings of current state-of-the-art knowledge in this ﬁeld
is presented in Section 3.
1.4. Outline of the article
The structure of the article is as follows. In Section 2 we describe
the research approach, design and methods, and in Section 3 we
brieﬂy describe our understanding of the state-of-the-art of the
expert knowledge in question. Later, we use this as a theoretical
framework to assess the goal achievement potential of plans
examined in the case study. In Section 4, we deﬁne mechanisms
through which expert knowledge may be introduced in planning
processes, how planners’ use of expert knowledge may contribute
to high goal achievement potential of plans, and how counter-
acting measures can be included in plans. In Section 5, these
mechanisms are critically examined in three empirical case studies
of land-use and transport planning processes in three medium-
sized Scandinavian cities. Cross-case analyses are conducted with
the aim of arriving at more general explanations as to how the use
of expert knowledge contributes to improving the goal achieve-
ment potential of plans or inhibits it. We discuss the ﬁndings in
Section 6 and answer the main research questions by analysing
how both planners researchers can change their practices in ways
contributing to improving the goal achievement potential of future
plans. In Section 7, we present our conclusions and ﬁnal reﬂections.
2. Research design and methodology
2.1. Research design
The research design is inspired by understandings embedded in
the meta-theory of critical realism (Bhaskar, 1989, 2008; Daner-
mark et al., 2002; Sayer, 1992). One is that in every concrete
situation a number of objects with their structures4 and embedded
causal powers, working through triggered mechanisms, contribute
to the occurrence of a certain event. This means that most events
have several causes. They are multi-causal. If mechanisms are
triggered and causal powers are activated, the resulting events
depend on the conditions in the speciﬁc situation (other
mechanisms in operation). In most cases, there are countless
combinations of circumstances that may inﬂuence whether a
speciﬁc causal power will manifest itself as a particular event. The
produced events are therefore a ‘‘complex compound effect of
inﬂuences drawn from different mechanisms, where some mecha-
nisms reinforce one another and others frustrate the manifestation of
each other’’ (Danermark et al., 2002:56). These contingent
conditions affect whether and how the mix of causal powers
and mechanisms actually produce a certain event, such as a plan4 Here, ‘structure’ refers to how an object is constructed, and not to social
structure in relation to human agency.that contributes to the reduction of trafﬁc volumes in an urban
region. Depending on the conditions present (the context), one and
the same mechanism may produce different events, whereas
different mechanisms or combinations of mechanisms can
produce one and the same event. The aim of research is to
distinguish important structures, causal powers and mechanisms,
and to examine them critically in empirical studies.
2.2. Methodology
Our main methods are structural and causal analyses, literature
studies and case studies (document studies and interviews). The
authors’ understanding of state-of-the-art expert knowledge
(Section 3) is based on literature studies combined with structural
and causal analyses in a critical realist perspective with a focus on
causal powers and mechanisms. When deﬁning the theoretical
framework for structuring, analysing and interpreting studies of
plan-making processes (Section 4), we combined structural and
causal analyses with literature studies (retroduction). The aim was
to arrive at potential mechanisms through which: expert
knowledge may be introduced in plan-making processes; use of
expert knowledge may contribute to coordination of land-use and
transport planning and to inclusion of trafﬁc-reducing measures in
plans; strategies and measures reducing goal achievement
potentials may be included in plans. The results were a number
of potential explanations to our secondary research questions
(listed in Section 1). These mechanisms or explanations were
critically examined in empirical case studies.
Cases selected for the empirical studies are overall planning
processes that may strongly affect land-use and transport
developments in three Scandinavian cities: Lund in Sweden,
Aarhus in Denmark and Trondheim in Norway. Our choice of cases
is partly pragmatic, reﬂecting practical and project-administrative
criteria, including among others that we needed to select one city
from each of these three countries. Within these frames, we
searched for strategic planning processes in cities focusing on
limiting trafﬁc volumes and/or GHG emissions from transport, and
where we would expect the expert knowledge in question to be
used and inﬂuential. Aarhus, Trondheim and Lund all have stated
objectives concerning reduced trafﬁc volumes and/or reduced GHG
emissions from transport. They are medium-sized university cities
(with populations varying from around 100,000 to 300,000) all
currently experiencing considerable population growth. They also
belong to a fairly homogeneous socio-economic and cultural
context – Scandinavia – with similar planning systems and
legislations. We have not analysed whether national context
matters in our studies.
In order to develop context-related explanations, we conducted
internal analyses for each case. We analysed the goal achievement
potential of each plan by comparing suggested strategies and
measures with ﬁndings and recommendations in the state-of-the-
art knowledge described in Section 3. Turning our analytical focus
to the plan-making processes, we critically examined the
mechanisms and explanation developed in the theoretical
framework in Section 4 in the concrete context of each case.
The aim was to answer the secondary research questions (i) to (iv)
listed in Section 1 for each case.
The main sources of data and information in the case studies
were planning documents and semi-structured in-depth inter-
views; the interviewees were 11 planners actively involved in
plan-making in the three cities. We developed an interview guide
focusing on the particular expert knowledge each planner related
to, whether and how the planners use it in the planning process,
how measures and strategies in the concrete plan were selected,
and whether and how the planners used the expert knowledge in
question in this selection. Furthermore, we asked whether there
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expert knowledge, how they judged its quality, and how they
perceived the goal achievement potential of the plan. Planning
documents included were the main policy documents, planning
analyses, impact assessments, and approved plans in each case.
We used tables when analysing the data. We listed our
theoretical explanations in the ﬁrst columns, and examined
whether statements made in documents and interviews were in
accordance with these explanations, much in the same way as the
summarising tables in Section 5.4. We listed the ﬁndings in the
relevant rows, using this as the basis for critical discussion of
whether each of the explanations was relevant in this concrete
case, and which were the most relevant. This was our basis for
answering the secondary research questions in each case.
We also conducted cross-case analyses aimed at making
analytical generalisation (Yin, 2003) or explanation-building
generalisation (Bergene, 2007; Yin, 2003). Our aim was to expand
the theoretical understandings of the phenomenon, rather than to
generalise correlations between outcomes and factors of inﬂuence
to a larger population of cases. Findings from all three cases were
analysed with respect to various theoretical approaches in iterative
processes (abduction), while aiming at arriving at better explana-
tions of the phenomenon, and in this way developing answers to
the main research questions.
3. State-of-the-art expert knowledge for trafﬁc-reducing land-
use and transport planning
This work concerns land-use and transport planning processes,
and focuses on the goal of ‘reducing or curbing urban trafﬁc
volumes’. ‘Expert knowledge’ therefore refers to theoretical and
empirical knowledge regarding how changes of land-use and
transport systems tend to affect travel behaviour and trafﬁc
volumes, as well as the methods for assessing the transport effects
of land-use and transport developments in speciﬁc contexts. This
section presents a brief description of our understanding of state-
of-the-art knowledge in this ﬁeld.
A main understanding is that certain kinds of developments of
land-use and transport systems, alone and in combinations,
contribute to long travelling distances, facilitate car-use and to
growth in trafﬁc volumes. Other kinds of developments contribute
to short travelling distances and facilitate the use of public
transport, cycling and walking instead of private car, thereby
contributing to a reduction in trafﬁc volumes.
The model in Fig. 2 illustrates the theoretical understanding
used here on how land-use, transport systems, travel behaviour
and trafﬁc volumes are causally interrelated, and on how planningFig. 2. Model of how developments in land-use, transport systems, travel behaviour
and trafﬁc volumes are causally interrelated, and how the planning and
development of land-use and transport systems interact with this overall
system (ﬁgure based on Tennøy, 2012).and development of land-use and transport systems interact with
this system. In this model, trafﬁc volumes are deﬁned by travel
behaviour: frequency of travel, length of travel, and car shares
(population size is exogenous in the model). Travel behaviour is
affected by the spatial layout of the city (density, location of
various activities, people’s use of activities) and by the absolute
and relative qualities of the transport systems, as well as by other
factors exogenous to this model. Land-use, transport systems and
travel behaviour inﬂuence one another reciprocally and are
affected by trafﬁc volumes. Changes in one variable of the system
may cause changes in several of the others, and several changes
often take place simultaneously.
Changes occurring in this system are both changes in land use
and transport systems consciously imposed through physical
planning and development, changes occurring as people using the
structures react to changes and changes resulting from factors
exogenous to the model. This could be changes in economy,
workforce participation, individuals’ needs and preferences. Land-
use and transport planning affect how land-use and transport
systems are developed, while the actual functioning of the city and
our knowledge of it affect planning and decision-making (or is
supposed to). These different forms of changes are interrelated,
since they belong in different but intersecting systems. It could
therefore be described as a complex system (Byrne, 2003). Changes
in land-use or transport systems affecting trafﬁc volumes are
normally a result of the activation of multiple mechanisms. The
main mechanisms have been theoretically explained and empiri-
cally examined for decades, and the ﬁndings can brieﬂy be
described as follows.
3.1. Effects of land-use developments on trafﬁc volumes
Overall density of a city affects trafﬁc volumes, since average
travel lengths are shorter in a dense city than in a sprawled city, thus
the increasing the possibility that travels will be short enough to be
done on foot or by bicycle and that car trips will be short. A dense city
provides a population base for a more ﬁne-meshed net of public
transport lines with more frequent departures than in a sprawled
city, thus reducing walking distances to and from public transport
stops, as well as waiting times. The conditions for car use will often
be worse in a dense city, with less room for parking and roads, lower
speed limits, more pedestrians and cyclists in the streets, etc. The
effects of overall density on trafﬁc volumes have been documented
in a number of studies. For instance, Newman and Kenworthy (1989,
1999) found strong relations between densities of urban areas and
fuel consumption for transport per capita in their comparison of
mega-cities worldwide. Næss, Sandberg, and Røe (1996) found the
same tendency when studying 22 Nordic towns.
Location within the urban structure affects accessibility to
various activities by deﬁning proximity and the available choice of
modes. Housing, workplace, retail services, etc., are more accessi-
ble by modes other than car the closer to the city centre they are
located, hence generating less car trafﬁc, as conﬁrmed in numerous
empirical studies (Hartoft-Nielsen, 2001a, 2001b; Næss, 2005,
2006a, 2012; Strømmen, 2001). Activities located in city centres
are for instance normally more accessible by public transport from
all parts of the region, and on foot or by bicycle for a higher
proportion of the population, than if located in other parts of the
city. Consequently, highly specialised workplaces, retail and
services drawing customers and employees from a larger region
tend to generate less trafﬁc if located in city centres (Hartoft-
Nielsen, 2001b; Næss et al., 1996; Strømmen, 2001; Tennøy,
Øksenholt, & Aarhaug, 2014). Daily services such as grocery stores,
kindergartens and hairdressers normally draw employees, users
and customers mainly from their local surroundings, and generate
less trafﬁc if dispersed to local centres close to their users. When
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inﬂuence of urban form on travel behaviour, and discussing the
results in view of the international literature, Næss (2012:21)
found that, ‘‘there is quite overwhelming evidence that urban spatial
structures matter to travel behaviour’’. Hence, the spatial structure
of an urban region affects transport demand and trafﬁc volumes in
the region. This is also the case when accounting for socio-
economic and demographic factors (Bhat & Guo, 2007; Brownstone
& Golob, 2009).
Other authors claim that neighbourhood-scale variables such as
land-use mix, connectivity and layout of local streets have major
effects on travel behaviour and car-use (for overviews showing the
commonality of this focus, see Boarnet & Crane, 2001; Cao,
Mokhtarian, & Handy, 2009; Ewing & Cervero, 2010). It could be
argued that such variables are strongly related to centrality of the
neighbourhoods (for instance, are grid patterns normally found in
central parts of a city and cul-de-sac patterns in less central parts of
the city), and that measured effects are due to centrality rather
than to local variables (Næss, 2011b). This is not an important issue
here, however, since this paper deals with the effects of overall
land-use and transport systems development.
3.2. Effects of transport systems development on trafﬁc volumes
The absolute and relative qualities of systems for different
transport modes affect the possibilities and preferences for modal
choices and choices of destinations (travel length), and thus trafﬁc
volumes. If travel is fast, comfortable and cheap, one would expect
trips to be more frequent and, on average, longer than if expensive,
uncomfortable and time-consuming. If travelling on public
transport, on bicycle or on foot becomes relatively better (faster,
cheaper, more comfortable, safer) than travelling by private car,
this would inﬂuence the modal choice and contribute to reduced
trafﬁc volumes. The opposite effect would be expected if travel by
car became relatively faster, cheaper, and so on (Banister, 2005).
Based on a review of numerous studies worldwide, Kenworthy
(2003) concluded that qualities of public transport services and
facilitation for private car-use (urban freeways, levels of parking)
strongly inﬂuence travel behaviour and energy use of transport in
cities. Several studies have demonstrated that increased urban
road capacity in itself contributes to increased car-use and trafﬁc
volumes (Downs, 1962; Goodwin, 1996; Mogridge, 1997; Noland &
Lem, 2002; SACTRA, 1994). Cairns et al. (1998) found that reduced
road capacity resulted in reduced car-use and road trafﬁc on
speciﬁc roads, as well as in the area as a whole.
How transport systems are developed affects land-use. Transport
infrastructure and trafﬁc take up space, and hence contribute to
sprawl. New road capacity reduces congestion and the relative travel
time by car, at least in the short-term perspective. This allows
households, businesses and workplaces to locate in ways contribut-
ing to more sprawl and car-dependence, thereby contributing to
increased trafﬁc volumes (Cervero, 2003; Johnston & Ceerla, 1996). If
land-use developments occur as sprawl, new transport infrastruc-
ture and services are needed to serve new areas. If new
developments require new public transport lines and the budgets
for public transport services are not increased, this implies a
weakening of public transport services at other places in the urban
structure and contributes to an overall increase in trafﬁc volumes.
Finally, increased trafﬁc volumes in inner and central parts of the city
may reduce the attractiveness of these areas, sprawling develop-
ments and activities outwards in a transport-demanding pattern.
3.3. Multiple mechanisms
Consequently, multiple mechanisms are involved when land-
use and transport systems development affect trafﬁc volumes.These mechanisms may reinforce each other, counteract each
other or not affect each other. This means that even if trafﬁc-
reducing measures and strategies are implemented, such as
improving public transport services, increased trafﬁc volumes
may still be experienced if other simultaneously working
mechanisms (such as urban sprawl) contributing to trafﬁc growth
outweigh this effect, so that the observable effect is trafﬁc growth.
This does not mean that the improved quality of public transport
services did not contribute to reduce trafﬁc volumes, but rather
that other simultaneously occurring changes triggered other
mechanisms, thus contributing to increases in trafﬁc volumes
that were greater.
3.4. Recommendations
Based on the above-mentioned and a number of similar studies,
there seems to be relatively widespread agreement in the scientiﬁc
literature on how land-use and transport systems ought to be
developed if urban road trafﬁc volumes are to be reduced (Banister,
2011, 2012; Downs, 1962; EEA, 2013; Hull, 2011; Kenworthy,
1990; Newman & Kenworthy, 1989, 1999; Næss, 2006a, 2012;
Owens, 1986; Strømmen, 2001; Tennøy, 2012). This can be
summarised and simpliﬁed as to implement the following
strategies, preferably in concert:
- Developing land-use as urban densiﬁcation close to city centres,
as ‘car-independent’ location of new activities, and with daily
services within walking distance of residential areas (density,
centrality, accessibility).
- Improving public transport services (frequency, coverage, speed,
comfort, prices) and conditions for walking and cycling
(infrastructure, maintenance, land-use).
- Imposing physical and ﬁscal restrictions on road trafﬁc (road
tolls, road capacity reductions, reduced access to parking or
increased parking prices).
Numerous policy and planning documents recommend similar
strategies (e.g. Municipality of Trondheim, 2008a, 2008b; Norwe-
gian Ministry of Transport & Communications, 2013; Norwegian
Ministry of the Environment, 2012; UN Habitat, 2009, 2013).
3.5. Planning methods
The literature is less than helpful when turning to the methods
planners use while producing trafﬁc-reducing plans, and when
assessing whether a concrete plan will contribute to increased or
decreased trafﬁc volumes. Because of the multi-causality and
complexity of this system, it is difﬁcult to predict accurately and
quantitatively what will happen when certain changes in land-use
or transport systems are implemented within a system (Næss,
2004; Næss & Strand, 2012; Tennøy, 2012). What actually happens
will be context-dependent (affected by other mechanisms), and
the future context cannot fully be known or controlled. This poses
challenges for planning practitioners using the knowledge
described above when attempting to make plans contributing to
reduce trafﬁc volumes. They need to analyse the context and the
alternatives for developments in order to arrive at recommenda-
tions (plans) for developments contributing to goal achievement.
The main task is to analyse which conditions need to be in place in
order to trigger certain mechanisms that contribute to the
reduction of trafﬁc volumes, while at the same time not triggering
mechanisms contributing to increase trafﬁc volumes. This means
that they aim to facilitate for the triggering certain combinations of
mechanisms by affecting relevant and impressionable factors of
the context. This is often termed coordinated strategies. The
planners will then (or are supposed to) analyse whether the
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required by the planning legislation in many countries, as
environmental impact assessments (EIA) and strategic impact
assessments (SEA).
Describing methods leading to such coordinated strategies is
not easy. Tennøy (2012) found that rarely could the planners she
interviewed explain which methods they used when making plans
and conducting analyses, nor could they refer to any written
descriptions of their methods (transport model analyses and the
like were not understood as methods for planning analyses). It
therefore seems that method knowledge is tacit knowledge
learned through education and experience. Furthermore, Tennøy
(2012) found that these methods are barely described in the
planning literature, leading her to the conclusion that the planning
community has yet to come up with deﬁned and systematic
descriptions of methods for analysing the complex problems and
contexts described here. This is problematic, among other reasons,
because: planners are not provided with good tools; the situation
hampers the planning community’s ability to examine methods
critically; it contributes to less useful methods being used; and it
makes the planners’ methods and analyses less transparent. Taken
together, it reduces the methods’ usability, use and validity. Næss
and Strand’s (2012) discussions of what they term ‘soft prediction’,
and Tennøy’s (2012) discussions of what she terms ‘professional
reasoning’, could be understood as ways of describing methods for
planning analysis.
We use this brief description of state-of-the-art expert
knowledge for land-use and transport planning for reduced trafﬁc
volumes when analysing the goal achievement potentials of the
plans in the case studies.
4. Theoretical framework – use and inﬂuence of expert
knowledge in planning
In developing the theoretical framework for structuring,
analysing and interpreting the case studies, we combine structural
and causal analyses with literature studies. We searched for
insights concerning mechanisms through which expert knowledge
is introduced in planning processes, how planners use this
knowledge when making plans, and how their use of it affects
the contents of plans. This included mechanisms through which
counteracting measures are included.
4.1. Mechanisms through which expert knowledge may be introduced
in planning processes
The ﬁrst set of mechanisms concerns how expert knowledge
may be introduced to planning processes. Krizek et al. (2009)
discuss planners’ use of what they term ‘research-generated
evidence’ in planning practice. Their discussions revolve around
practitioners’ direct use of research-generated knowledge, without
going into detail on how this could happen. One might reason that
it involves planners searching for relevant literature when facing a
planning problem and using this knowledge to better understand
the problem, ﬁnding useful alternatives or assessing the con-
sequences of proposed plans or projects. Another way could be to
invite relevant researchers to contribute with their research
ﬁndings and their research-based knowledge in planning process-
es. Krizek et al. (2009) conclude that planning practice is minimally
affected by research, and they ﬁnd this to be problematic. This is in
line with Tennøy’s (2012) ﬁndings in interviews, where very few
planners could list any references to written sources for the
knowledge they used when making plans.
Krizek et al. (2009:474) ﬁnd that planners instead ‘‘practice
what they learnt at school, what their predecessors practiced, or
replicate what are considered to be best practices’’. Planners learnthrough their own experiences, through cooperation and discus-
sions with other planners, through evaluations and best practice
descriptions of plans and projects, and from listening to
particularly knowledgeable and respected planners. Planners also
read good practice guides, planning guidelines and research
summaries. This could be understood as planners forming a
community of practice (Wenger, 1998), where persons within a
domain of knowledge form a social fabric of learning through their
shared practices.
Owens et al. (2006) argue that rather than limiting the
discussions to short term and instrumental use of research-based
knowledge or ‘direct hits’, more nuanced and sophisticated
understandings of knowledge-transfer to policy should be devel-
oped. They refer to Radaelli’s (1995) understanding of knowledge
transfer as ‘knowledge creep’, ‘‘whereby research gradually inﬁl-
trates policy’’, and to Weiss’s (1977, 1979) understanding of
‘enlightenment’, ‘‘involving slow changes in vocabulary and mindset’’
(Owens et al., 2006:640). This concerns the shaping of ideas about
which means can contribute to achieving certain objectives, and –
perhaps more importantly – the shaping of what is understood as
problems and challenges. Owens et al. (2006) ﬁnd that, ‘‘it is
perhaps most helpful to think in terms of a continuum of inﬂuence and
utility, ranging from clear and immediate impacts to long-term subtle
processes in which problem deﬁnitions and modes of thinking change’’.
They conclude that when studying use of research-based
knowledge in policy-making, we need to be conscious of the
many mechanisms of knowledge transfer from research to
practice, although Owens et al. do not speciﬁcally describe them.
This could happen through knowledge diffusion (Ibert, 2007;
Shipan & Volden, 2008), where knowledge spreads among people
in different ways. Based on our own experiences as planners and
researchers, relevant mechanisms for knowledge diffusion can be
deduced within planning practice. Planners and the planning
community could gradually learn from research and knowledge
development through the education of planning students, at
conferences, in commissioned works acquired from research
institutions and specialised consultants, or from readings of
popular science or scientiﬁc articles. When new knowledge, ideas
and framings diffuse to forerunners among practitioners, they may
be reﬂected in overall planning documents such as municipal plans
and in government white papers and guidelines. Following from
this, the new knowledge may be used in operational plans and
concrete projects, and in the evaluations of implemented projects.
The wider planning community may learn from this, contributing
to more planners bringing such knowledge into planning discus-
sions and processes. Adopted plans, implemented projects and
evaluations often constitute stronger references and arguments
than research articles for planning practitioners, and not least for
political decision-makers. In this way, the expert knowledge could
diffuse to the planning community, and affect how planners frame
objectives, problems, alternatives and relevant consequences
(Scho¨n, 1983; Tennøy, 2010). Eventually, the knowledge becomes
embedded in planners, who bring it into planning processes through
the ways they act, explain and argue. Over time, this can spread to
the wider community. Forerunner politicians, NGOs and others
may pick up new research and expert knowledge and bring it into
planning processes.
Based on these discussions, seven partially overlapping
mechanisms through which the expert knowledge in question
could be introduced in the planning process are the following. The
ﬁrst concerns planners searching for expert knowledge in scientiﬁc
papers and research syntheses and bringing it to the planning
process. The second is researchers or consultants bringing the
expert knowledge into the planning process. The third is planners
learning from other planners through discussion, previous plans,
what has been done elsewhere, popular science journals, and
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and enlightenment, where the framing of problems, objectives,
alternatives, etc., change over time due to the inﬂuence of expert
knowledge through ﬁne-grained and iterative processes. What
planners ‘learn at school’ could be included here. The ﬁfth is
planners learning from government white papers, planning
guidelines, etc. The sixth is the knowledge embedded in
knowledgeable planners taking part in the process. The seventh
is politicians, NGOs and others bringing such knowledge into the
planning process. The case studies critically examine whether
these and other mechanisms are important in introducing expert
knowledge to the examined plan-making processes.
4.2. Mechanisms through which use of the expert knowledge may
contribute to coordination and to inclusion of trafﬁc-reducing
measures
We now turn to mechanisms through which expert knowledge
may be applied in planning processes in ways contributing to
coordination of land-use and transport planning, as well as to
inclusion of strategies, measures and projects that contribute to a
reduction in trafﬁc volumes (discussed in Section 3). When
searching the literature for descriptions and discussions of how
expert knowledge is used or is supposed to be used by practitioners
in concrete plan-making in ways inﬂuencing the contents of the
plans, ﬁndings are scarce.
The institutional and organisational settings of a planning
process deﬁne the rules of the game. This regards which
procedures to follow, as well as the roles, powers and duties of
the numerous and different actors involved. Within these frames,
Tennøy (2012) found that the objectives, knowledge and powers of
the planning practitioners involved in a plan-making process
(working for various private and public employers) affect how the
planners can and do act and interact, and hence how the various
tasks in the plan-making process are carried out (as illustrated in
Fig. 3). These are ﬁne-grained and complex processes in which the
different actors pursue their objectives and concerns and use
expert knowledge and other kinds of knowledge in a constant
power struggle. What become the prominent objectives and what
knowledge becomes more inﬂuential are shaped in these processes
(Flyvbjerg, 2004; Hajer, 1995; Richardson, 2005). This eventually
deﬁnes the contents of the resulting plans.
These struggles take place in the various tasks carried out as
parts of a planning process. Through the shifting discussions
regarding planning, those that seem to deﬁne planning and to be
unavoidable in a practice deﬁned as planning (Banﬁeld, 1959;
Friedmann, 1987) may be listed as:
- Situation analysis and problem deﬁnition
- Formulation of goals and objectives
- Identiﬁcation and design of alternatives
- Identiﬁcation, prediction and assessment of impacts and con-
sequences of each alternative (impact assessments)The planners’ 
objecves 
The planners’ 
expert knowledge
The planners’ 
powers 
How th e 
planners act, 
and thus: How 
tasks in the 
plan-making 
process are  
carried out 
Fig. 3. The objectives, knowledge and powers of the actors deﬁne how they act and in
prominent, and eventually the contents of the plans (ﬁgure based on Tennøy, 2012).- Comparison of alternatives with respect to consequences in
relation to desired objectives and other values
- Making planning proposals and recommendations
Planning processes will not normally follow a direct course of
action from situation analysis to recommendations. Rather, they
are iterative and deliberative processes, more to be understood as
continuous discussions regarding where we want to go, and how to
get there.
The question is then how planners can and do use expert
knowledge when carrying out these tasks, and how their use of this
knowledge can lead to coordination of land-use and transport
planning and to selection of trafﬁc-reducing measures and
strategies. Rein and Scho¨n (1993) explain how practitioners’
professional knowledge is the main basis for their knowing and
acting. It provides them with the tools and understandings guiding
(translated by us to planning practice): the issues they focus on
when describing the situation; how they formulate problems; the
alternatives they consider; the measures they include in alter-
natives; the methods they choose for analysis; how they carry out
the analyses; how they interpret and respond to results; how they
compare alternatives; and how they select the measures and
combinations of measures they include in a planning proposal. This
means that the kinds of knowledge planners possess, together with
the objectives they give priority to, strongly affects the kind of
plans they can and do make. For instance, a traditional transport
planner struggling with a congestion problem would probably
arrive at increasing road capacity as a measure for solving the
problem. A land-use and transport planner possessing the expert
knowledge in question would know that this would only solve the
problem in the short term. Instead, she would seek ways of
reducing trafﬁc loads and hence congestion through improving
public transport services, regulating parking access, developing
local centres, steering new land-use developments to central areas,
etc. An important mechanism through which the expert knowl-
edge in question comes to be used, and contributes to coordination
of land-use and transport developments and inclusion of trafﬁc-
reducing strategies, may therefore be as constituting a basis for
knowing and acting that allows for coordinating land-use and
transport planning, and for selecting trafﬁc-reducing measures.
A second mechanism may be that planners turn to research-
based sources or to knowledgeable individuals for the knowledge
they need to solve speciﬁc planning problems, and use this to
understand cause–effect relations better or to ﬁnd new ways of solving
planning problems. Moreover, they can use empirical knowledge in
their analyses of effects of a certain measure in a certain type of
context, and they can seek advice about which methods are suitable
for certain analyses. In order to make other planners, politicians and
others understand and accept their knowledge claims, planners
need to be able to present rational explanations for how and why
certain measures and strategies are likely to contribute to the
achievement of certain goals, while others are not (see Rydin
(2007:58) for elaborate reﬂections on rationality). A thirdWhich objec ves 
are ma de 
prominent  
Which  
knowledge  is 
applied, and how 
Whether th e plans 
produced 
contribute to an 
increas e or 
decrease of traﬃc 
volumes 
teract in planning processes, and hence which objectives and knowledge become
A. Tennøy et al. / Progress in Planning 109 (2016) 1–3210mechanism could hence be that planners use theoretical explana-
tions from the expert knowledge in question when presenting
rational and trustworthy knowledge claims concerning why
coordination of land-use and transport systems development, as
well as selection of certain measures rather than others, are ways
towards achieving deﬁned objectives. Fourth, planners may use
theoretical or empirical expert knowledge as convincing arguments
in discussions and struggles in planning processes. Fifth, planners
can also refer to the body of knowledge as references, preferably in
the form of written documents accepted as trustworthy and valid
by decision-makers. This could demonstrate that their under-
standings, analyses and judgments are anchored in a larger
knowledge base and add to the legitimacy of their knowledge
claims, thus strengthening the impact of their arguments. These
mechanisms, or ways of using expert knowledge in planning,
partly overlap. The case studies critically examine whether these
are relevant mechanisms through which planners use the expert
knowledge in ways contributing to coordination of land-use and
transport planning, and to inclusion of trafﬁc-reducing measures.
4.3. Mechanisms through which counteracting measures may be
included in plans
It is interesting to investigate how and why counteracting
measures and strategies with respect to this objective are included
in plans, especially in cases where reduced (growth in) trafﬁc
volumes is explicitly stated as an objective. The primary focus in
our discussions is whether and how planners use expert
knowledge when making plans, and how this affects the contents
of plans. However, as previously discussed, planners do not make
plans in a vacuum, far from it: property developers and political
decision-makers, for example, inﬂuence planning and the contents
of plans in several ways. When investigating mechanisms through
which counteracting measures are included in plans aiming at
reducing trafﬁc volumes, the interplay between planning practi-
tioners and other actors needs to be considered. Through
theoretical and empirical investigations, Tennøy (2012) identiﬁed
ﬁve overall mechanisms through which planners arrive at trafﬁc-
increasing rather than trafﬁc-reducing plans: (i) objectives
concerning reduction of trafﬁc volumes are not introduced in
the planning process, or (ii) they are ousted by other objectives.
Furthermore, (iii) relevant expert knowledge is not introduced to,
(iv) or is ousted from the plan-making process, or (v) it is applied
wrongly. These mechanisms are interrelated in several ways (see
also discussions in Section 4.2 and Fig. 3).
If reducing trafﬁc volumes is not introduced as a prominent
objective in a planning process, trafﬁc-increasing measures may be
included in order to achieve other goals, and without consideration
as to whether this contributes to increase trafﬁc volumes. If, as in
all three cases studied here, reducing (growth in) trafﬁc volumes is
stated as a prominent objective, this objective could anyhow be
ousted by other objectives understood as more important, and
which require inclusion of trafﬁc-increasing measures. This could
happen for instance if political decision-makers signal that
implementation or non-implementation of certain measures is
politically unacceptable, and planners obey these signals (see, e.g.,
Flyvbjerg, 1998 or Healey, 2009 for interesting discussions). In
such cases, planners could meet political signals by presenting
knowledge-based analyses and arguments explaining why these
measures are counter-productive in relation to prominent political
goals, or they may ask researchers to present research-based
knowledge concerning the issue. If planners or others do not present
knowledge, analyses or arguments explaining the counteracting
effects, politicians may not be aware of this. Politicians may be
unwilling to listen to such knowledge or arguments (Flyvbjerg,
1998; Sager & Ravlum, 2005). Owens et al. (2006) point toproblems related to communication and timeliness. Among other
things, this means that policy (and hence sometimes planning
practitioners) demands uncomplicated messages, which research
often neither would nor could offer. It may also be a problem that
research lags behind actual problems, and hence cannot provide
good answers to policy problems. Often, research is instead
‘‘uncomfortably ahead of contemporary policy agendas’’ (Owens
et al., 2006:637). In such cases, knowledge can be understood as
threatening if it calls for strategies and measures that do not
support the dominant policy agendas.
Properties of the planners may mean that they are unwilling or
unable to explain how and why certain strategies or measures are
counter-productive. If planners are to speak up to decisions-
makers about counter-productive measures, their understanding
of their role must allow them to do so. This is not always the case.
As explained by Lukes’ (2005) third dimension of power, it could be
that planners obey the decision-makers because they understand
this as ‘their role in the existing order of things’. Furthermore, if
they are to speak up, the planners would need to be knowledgeable
with respect to the issues in question, which is not necessarily the
case. There are variations as to how skilful and experienced
planners are within different issues of planning. If it is assumed
that specialised, skilful, knowledgeable and experienced planners
are better at making plans with high goal achievement potentials
than other planners (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986; Flyvbjerg, 2001), a
lack of skilfulness or knowledge among the planners involved
could be an explanation when measures and strategies counter-
acting the goal achievement potential are included in the plans.
There has been – at least in part – a paradigm shift in this ﬁeld
over the past few decades (Owens, 1995), and planning is a multi-
disciplinary profession. Planners are educated within various
disciplines (for instance, land-use planning and transportation
planning) and at different times. They may therefore have various
degrees of insight and different understandings of how land-use
and transport system developments affect travel behaviour and
trafﬁc volumes. Tennøy (2012) found in her empirical studies that
most planners deeply involved in the planning processes she
studied knew of the expert knowledge in question. Nonetheless,
few knew and understood it well enough to be able to make trafﬁc-
reducing plans in complex contexts such as cities, to assess the
trafﬁc-generating potential of proposed plans, or to present
convincing arguments based on such knowledge in tough
discussions. Shortcomings in planners’ competencies may also
include that they rely on outdated knowledge or undocumented
‘planning myths’, as discussed by Næss et al. (2013). Here,
‘planning myths’ refers to undocumented ideas and beliefs
concerning cause–effect relations that are not in accordance with
state-of-the-art scientiﬁc knowledge. Myths and outdated knowl-
edge could be parts of the planners’ framing of objectives,
alternatives, assessments, etc. Hence, properties of the planners
may cause that they are not aware of or disagree that these are
counter-productive strategies, measures and projects. For a variety
of reasons, planners may also favour trafﬁc-increasing strategies
and measures.
Other explanations could be related to characteristics of the
knowledge itself. Krizek et al. (2009) found that one inhibitor
preventing the use of research-based evidence in planning practice
is that the evidence is poor within some topics. They also found
that planners often lack the resources to seek out and critically
read research ﬁndings, and to translate and introduce it in the
concrete context. Good research summaries could help overcome
this problem, but they claim that research summaries are often
unavailable. Tennøy (2012) found that expert knowledge needs to
represent reality relatively correctly, be scientiﬁcally sound and
usable if it is to be used in and inﬂuence plan-making. She found
that the expert knowledge in question mostly meets these criteria,
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usable and referable (for planning practice) descriptions of
theoretical understandings of ‘how the system works’, which is
underpinned by relevant empirical knowledge. Furthermore, the
effects of some cause–effect relations are not well documented,
and the strengths of some effects are barely studied empirically in
certain contexts (such as smaller cities), or in combination.
Additionally, she found that the planners’ main method of analysis,
which she termed ‘professional reasoning’, is described inade-
quately and hence probably poorly evaluated and developed (as
discussed in Section 3).
Taken together, this could cause that planners do not possess or
understand the expert knowledge in question, and hence that they
do not introduce it in planning processes. If introduced, the expert
knowledge may anyhow be ousted by other knowledge. More
inclusion of lay knowledge may increase the difﬁculties of
distinguishing what is valid knowledge from less substantiated
knowledge claims (Rydin, 2007). Another imaginable explanation
could be that planners involved relate to other research-based
knowledge, concluding that the assumed trafﬁc-increasing mea-
sures and strategies (as described in Section 3) would not have
such an effect. We do not know of any actual examples of such
relevant competing and contradicting research-based knowledge.
If it were presented, it would call for a rewriting or updating of
current state-of-the-art knowledge.
Furthermore, expert knowledge may be wrongly applied, con-
sciously or otherwise. Wachs (1989, 1990) and Flyvbjerg, Holm,
and Buhl (2002) disclosed how planners may be ‘lying with
numbers’. Research may be used selectively and strategically, and
unwelcome ﬁndings may be downplayed or excluded (Krizek et al.,
2009; Næss, 2011a; Owens, 2005; Tennøy, 2012), or it may be used
symbolically to legitimise and sustain predetermined positions
(Amara, Ouimet, & Landry, 2004). Another concern is that issues
can be framed in ways that reduce complexity and lead to ‘‘simple,
but potentially misleading, policy prescriptions as result’’ (Owens
et al., 2006:637).
All the above-listed issues are considered here as mechanisms
through which strategies, measures and projects contributing to
reducing their goal achievement potential may be included in
plans. We have investigated how this acts out in three concrete
cases.
5. Analyses of three case studies
In this section, we present and analyse our studies of strategic
planning processes in Trondheim (Norway), Lund (Sweden) and
Aarhus (Denmark). We critically analyse the mechanisms deﬁned
in Section 4 in the concrete contexts of the cases, and answer the
four sub-questions deﬁned in Section 1 for each case. This allows us
to develop context-related explanations. We also carry out cross-
case analyses to distinguish important structures, causal powers
and mechanisms across cases, in this way arriving at more general
explanations of the phenomena we study, and use this to expand
the theoretical understandings of these phenomena.
5.1. Trondheim Environmental Package for Transport, Norway
5.1.1. Introducing the Trondheim case
The Trondheim case concerns the planning processes leading to
the land-use and transport systems development package
Trondheim Environmental Package for Transport5 (referred to below
as the Trondheim Package). Trondheim is the third largest
municipality in Norway with 180,000 inhabitants (the fourth5 It has recently been decided that the ofﬁcial English name of the package is:
Greener Trondheim – Partnership for sustainable transport.largest city if deﬁned as an ‘urban settlement’), and is experiencing
population growth. It is the main city in the region, and the home of
the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (22,000
students, 5000 employees).
The analyses are based on document studies and interviews
with eight planners, the majority of whom are highly skilled and
have a long and broad experience in urban planning as
practitioners and consultants; some as university researchers
and lecturers. They had major roles in the Trondheim Package or in
planning processes underpinning it. At the time of the interviews,
three planners worked for the municipal planning authorities, two
for the Norwegian Public Roads Administration (NPRA), one for the
County Governor’s ofﬁce, one for the County Administration, and
one for the Public Transport Administration.
The main documents examined were: the political document
Trondheim Environmental Package for Transport (MoT, 2008a); a
working paper assessing the expected effects of suggested
measures in the package presented by the Chief Municipal
Executive to the Municipal Climate Committee (MoT, 2008b);
the municipal Transport Plan for Trondheim 2006–2015 (MoT,
2007a); and the overall Municipal Land Use Plan 2006–2018 (MoT,
2007b). These are interrelated and refer to each other, and they are
to a high degree produced in a cooperation of several of the same
planners. They are overall and strategic plans inﬂuencing land-use
and transport systems developments in Trondheim. We also read a
number of other documents as background material.
Trondheim experienced steady trafﬁc growth in the years
before the Trondheim Package discussions started, a total of
12 percent between 2002 and 2006 according to Jean-Hansen,
Hanssen, and Aas (2009). Owing to population growth and people
changing from other modes to car, trafﬁc growth was expected to
continue, causing with increasing CO2 emissions, local environ-
mental problems and congestions (MoT, 2007a, 2008a). The toll
cordon, which had ﬁnanced transport system developments for
15 years, was closed down at the end of 2005. The National
transport plan discussions signalled that Trondheim would be
granted virtually no funding for transport infrastructure. Hence,
the municipal transport plan presented a future situation
characterised by increasing trafﬁc volumes, environmental pro-
blems, congestion and inadequate tools by which to improve the
situation (MoT, 2007a). Strong governmental signals concerning
the need to curb CO2 emissions from road trafﬁc intensiﬁed the
local focus on the issue.
In dealing with the situation, the City Council of Trondheim
initiated and adopted the Trondheim Package in 2008 (MoT,
2008a). This is a strategic, coordinated land-use and transport plan.
The ﬁrst of its 10 main goals is to reduce CO2 emissions from
transport by at least 20 percent before 2018. The second objective
is to reduce travel by private car from 58 percent of all trips in
2008 to 50 percent in 2018. The share of trips made using public
transport on foot or bicycle should increase from 42 percent to
50 percent. The 20 percent CO2 emission reduction target is to be
achieved through reduced trafﬁc volumes (reducing CO2 emission
by 12 percent) and a transition to less polluting engines, fuels, etc.
(reducing CO2 emission by 8 percent). The remaining eight
objectives concern concrete measures towards achieving the main
objectives (such as increasing average speed for public transport)
and local environmental objectives (reducing the number of
people exposed to noise above certain levels).
The planners explained that the Trondheim Package was a truly
political initiative. Several political parties discussed various
initiatives, and the Trondheim Labour Party presented a proposal
at their 2008 annual meeting. This developed into the Trondheim
Package through a political process, and was adopted with the
support of six political parties a few months later. The politicians
put together the package, but in strong interaction with the
Table 1
Measures included in the Trondheim Package and our assessments of whether they
contribute to or counteract the goal achievement potential of the plan (focusing on
reducing trafﬁc volumes and GHG emissions from transport).
Element included in the plan How it affects goal
achievement potential
Reintroducing toll cordon Contributes to reducing
trafﬁc volumes
Improving bicycle infrastructure and the
winter maintenance for cycling
Contributes to reducing
trafﬁc volumes
Substantially improving public transport
services, reducing prices
Contributes to reducing
trafﬁc volumes
Reducing parking access and increasing
parking fees in the city centre
Contributes to reducing
trafﬁc volumes
Land-use densiﬁcation strategy, but
20 percent of new dwellings allowed
to be located on new land and
40 percent of new workplace-intensive
workplaces are allowed to be located
with low public transport access
In total contributes to
increasing trafﬁc volumes
Substantially increasing urban
road capacity
Allows and contributes
to increasing trafﬁc
volumes
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package were already analysed in previous planning processes,
most recently in the municipal transport plan (MoT, 2007a). These
plans and analyses were produced in collaboration among several
planners working for different actors in more or less open planning
processes, and adopted by the relevant political bodies. The strong
political involvement, and the fact that several political parties
supported the package, ensured a stronger political anchoring than
for most packages of this type. According to planners interviewed,
the measures and strategies selected for inclusion in the
Trondheim Package were therefore a result of compromises
among different political priorities. What was politically accept-
able was an important determinant for what was included in the
package, but the more expert-driven plans and analyses made up
the menu from which the politicians selected the measures and
projects they included.
5.1.2. The goal achievement potential of the Trondheim Package
The Trondheim Package includes several measures that,
according to state-of-the-art knowledge (as presented in Section
3), will contribute to reducing trafﬁc volumes. This includes:
completing a comprehensive bicycle network; reducing parking
access; improving frequencies, speed and coverage of the public
transport system; trafﬁc regulations and trafﬁc capacity reductions
in the city centre; and reintroduction of the toll cordon.6 The toll
cordon is the main source of income ﬁnancing other measures. The
package includes major road expansion projects, and more than
50 percent of the funding will be used for road construction (MoT,
2008a). Furthermore, there is a densiﬁcation strategy for land-use
development, where 80 percent of new residences are to be located
within the existing urban area demarcations and 60 percent of new
labour-intensive workplaces in close proximity to the main public
transport corridor. This is probably a much stronger densiﬁcation
strategy than in many other cities. However, the strategy allows
20 percent of new housing to be built on new land outside the
urban demarcation area, and 40 percent of workplace and visitor-
intensive workplaces built in areas not well covered by public
transport, and with few people living within walking and cycling
distance. This means that substantial parts of new developments
may take place in mainly car-based locations, thereby contributing
to increasing trafﬁc volumes and reducing the goal achievement
potential of the package. This was pointed out by local planners in
interviews. Our assessments are summarised in Table 1.
Since 2008, public transport services have substantially
improved and the bicycle network has been extended. The toll
cordon was reintroduced in 2010. According to state-of-the-art
knowledge, as discussed in Section 3, this should contribute to
reducing trafﬁc volumes. From the homepages of the Trondheim
Package, we learn that this has indeed occurred. The number of
public transport passengers increased by 23 percent from 2010 to
2012, while the number of car trips decreased by an impressive
10 percent (some uncertainties) (MoT, 2013). So far, the road
projects have not been implemented.
5.1.3. Mechanisms through which the expert knowledge was
introduced
Planning documents and interviews with planners clearly
demonstrate that several sources of knowledge were used by
planners when compiling the Trondheim Package and the6 According to Meland, Tretvik, and Welde (2010), the trafﬁc increase in the year
following removal of the toll cordon (operating in rush hours) in Trondheim in
2005 was two percentage points above the average general trafﬁc growth in the
county (no other substantial and expected inﬂuential changes taking place at the
time), which could lead to the understanding that reintroducing the toll cordon
would not in itself contribute to a strong reduction or hold on trafﬁc growth.underlying plans and analyses. They refer to governmental
documents, previous municipal plans and other plans relevant
to the issues discussed. They also refer to numerous sources in
describing the context as current states, trends and challenges:
travel surveys, national statistics and indicators, various registers,
mapping of speciﬁc issues, as well as other plans and policy
documents at governmental, municipal and project levels. Most of
the planners interviewed demonstrated comprehensive knowl-
edge regarding their city – its history, planning history, state,
developments, physical layout, challenges, etc. – even though they
were often unable to pinpoint the sources for this knowledge.
Several planners also demonstrated their knowledge of what was
politically acceptable in the speciﬁc context. The main sources for
this knowledge were policy documents, public statements and
politicians’ actions in previous cases, as well as direct exchanges
between planners and politicians.
When asked how the expert knowledge in question was
introduced in the planning processes, the planners explained that
people were knowledge carriers. They referred to the competencies
and work of the other named planners involved. When asked, for
instance, how public transport knowledge was brought into the
Trondheim Package discussions, three local planners were
mentioned, while a public transport analysis by external experts
in the previous year was not. In order to attain the necessary
competence in concrete planning processes, they ensured that
persons with complementary knowledge are included. It therefore
seems that a main mechanism through which the expert
knowledge in question is brought into the planning processes is
as embedded in the planners involved.
Planning documents, as well as interviewees, make frequent
reference to other and previous plans for the Trondheim area. The
planners explained that they use experience-based knowledge
obtained through working with various projects and individuals
over time. This indicates that learning from other planners is an
important mechanism.
There are clear indications that a knowledge creep has taken
place in Trondheim. This is conﬁrmed by planners saying that some
central politicians also relate to the expert knowledge in question.
The planners explained that a road link planned with six lanes 10–
20 years previously had now actually been built, but with two
lanes. The reduced capacity was due to some planners arguing for
years as to why this was altogether better, and to a gradual mutual
understanding (enlightenment) of this among planners and
politicians. Our understanding that knowledge creep has taken
7 Elasticities (E) are often considered as a simple and comprehensible
quantitative measure of the responsiveness of one variable on another. In its
simplest form it may be deﬁned as ‘‘E = percent change in Y/percent change in X’’
(Fearnley and Bekken, 2005:ii), where Y is the effect variable.
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indicated that they did not possess or relate to the expert
knowledge in question.
There are few references to readings of scientiﬁc works in
documents or interviews. One interviewee explained that they
rarely turn to academic or scientiﬁc literature. Instead, they refer to
strategies and objectives in government, county and municipal
policy documents, since these are stronger references in dialogue
with politicians. Several documents and planners referred to two
locally well-known scientiﬁc studies with Trondheim as case area
(Meland, 2002; Strømmen, 2001). The assessment of the Trond-
heim Package compiled for the Climate Committee (MoT, 2008b)
referred to a few more and less scientiﬁc works and research
syntheses. Hence, readings of scientiﬁc literature seem to be one
mechanism by which expert knowledge is brought into the plan-
making processes, though not an important one.
5.1.4. Mechanisms through which use of expert knowledge
contributed to coordination and inclusion of trafﬁc-reducing measures
The planning documents deﬁning and analysing the Trondheim
Package, along with the underlying planning documents and
analyses, are steeped in the expert knowledge in question. There
are references to land-use developments, developments of
different parts of the transport system, city centre development,
parking, etc., in all the examined documents, and the necessity of
seeing these elements as integrated parts of urban development is
highlighted. There are, however, few references to speciﬁc sources.
The reference practice is generally poor.
When we asked ﬁve of the planners about which factors they
saw as most important for changes of modal splits and trafﬁc
volumes in Trondheim, all mentioned land-use as well as
development of various parts of the transport system, and
explained how these are interrelated. The political document
describing the Trondheim Package lists the strategies and
measures included, and states simply that they will have trafﬁc-
reducing effects (MoT, 2008a). All other examined documents
discuss (to varying degrees) how the different elements affect: each
other, accessibility, trafﬁc volumes, the environment, living
conditions in the city and other relevant outcome categories.
These ﬁndings clearly indicate that the expert knowledge in
question was the main basis for planners’ knowing and acting when
producing the Trondheim Package. This contributed to founding
the understanding that coordinated efforts were necessary, as well
as which measures had to be included, if the goal achievement
potential of the package was to be improved with respect to
reduced trafﬁc volumes.
Knowledge claims deriving from the expert knowledge in
question are used for explaining interrelations between land-use,
transport system developments and trafﬁc volumes in plans and
analyses. For instance, the introduction to the chapter on public
transport in the Municipal Transport Plan states: ‘‘A competitive
public transport system is decisive for a denser and less resource
demanding urban structure to work’’ (MoT, 2007a:22). A model
explains how improved public transport services contribute to
reducing car-use through several mechanisms. The analyses are
conducted as simpliﬁed ‘professional reasoning’, with the expert
knowledge in question used to explain how and why, for instance,
parking restrictions and densiﬁcation are important strategies for
keeping trafﬁc volumes down (MoT, 2007a).
In the working document prepared for the municipality’s
climate committee (MoT, 2008b), which we understand as the
impact assessment of the Trondheim Package, the planner writing
it quantiﬁed the effects of the measures and strategies included in
order to arrive at quantitative answers as to whether the package
would ensure that the deﬁned goals were achieved. For this, he
explained, he turned to the expert knowledge for help. He looked upresearch summaries concerning, for example, average elasticities,7
for changes in price, frequency, speed, etc. of public transport on
passenger growth (references to Norheim & Ruud, 2007) and for
effects of the toll cordon on road trafﬁc. Based on such data, he
made rough estimates of the expected reduction in car driver trips
per year. The document emphasises that these are rough estimates.
The calculations showed that the measures and strategies included
in the package, implemented with the assumed strength, would
not ensure goal achievement, and that stronger measures were
indeed necessary. In this case, the planner hence turned to the
expert knowledge for empirical data, while he already knew the
cause–effect relations between the measures suggested and the
expected effects. He expressed the view that he saw these
elasticities as rules of thumbs rather than as scientiﬁc knowledge,
hence demonstrating his ability to question and judge knowledge.
Other interviewees also did this when explaining their scepticism
to the validity of model-based transport analyses conducted in
relation to overall planning analyses as well as for concrete
projects.
Planners also used research-based data and knowledge as
arguments. For instance, restricting parking access in general, it
was argued: ‘‘experiences from Norway and other countries show
that, on average, a 10 percent reduction of parking capacity in the
city centre will result in 1.5 percent fewer car trips and 1.4 percent
more public transport trips’’, with reference to the Institute of
Transport Economics (but with no reference to any speciﬁc
document or author) (MoT, 2007a:70). When preparing the
municipal transport plan the planners demonstrated, with the
help of the expert knowledge in question, the limited room for
meeting future problems if politicians were not willing to include
restrictive means to keeping trafﬁc volumes down and to
reintroducing the toll cordon.
One interviewee said that the County Governor’s ofﬁce had
recently ﬁled a formal complaint about a zoning plan allowing
workplace developments in a speciﬁc area not well supported by
public transport, this in order to force the planning authorities to
get to grips with development in the area. The County Governor’s
ofﬁce used cause–effect relations from the expert knowledge in
question in explaining how and why the ongoing development was
not in accordance with the overall planning objectives, and as an
argument for stopping this development. This spurred the
planning authorities into mapping the ongoing development,
which they found was less desirable than expected. In the proposal
for the new municipal plan, the rules for development in this area
are clearer and stricter. This is an example of how planners using
the expert knowledge in question – by explaining and as an
argument – succeeded in achieving shifts contributing to less
trafﬁc-increasing planning and development.
We found no examples in documents or interviews of
references to expert knowledge as a ‘body of knowledge’ in order
to strengthen arguments, nor to any document where this
knowledge is explained or documented.
5.1.5. Mechanisms through which counter-productive measures were
included
We understand particularly two elements in the Trondheim
Package as reducing its goal achievement potential (as discussed in
Section 5.1.2): urban road capacity expansion and the land-use
strategy allowing new developments in car-dependent locations.
Most of the planners interviewed agreed that increasing road
capacity and otherwise facilitating private car use would cause and
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document for the Trondheim Package (MoT, 2008a). In interviews,
several planners volunteered the main mechanisms causing
increased road capacity to contribute to growth in trafﬁc volumes,
but without reference to written professional or academic
knowledge. One planner questioned the sense in expanding road
capacity if a main objective was to reduce trafﬁc volumes and thus
– causing less need for road capacity in the future. Planners are
therefore aware of this mechanism. There were, however, no signs
in planning documents or in interviews of planners meeting
proposals for road capacity expansions by knowledge-based argu-
ments or analyses in order to explain to politicians that road
expansions would reduce the goal achievement potential of the
Trondheim Package.
Instead, two planners working closely on the Trondheim
Package came up with a number of arguments as to why increased
road capacity would not cause growth in trafﬁc volumes in this
particular case. They described the road construction projects as
completion of the ring road system in Trondheim, meant to drain
road trafﬁc from the city centre, central areas and residential areas.
Since there were few or even no delays on the roads at the time,
they argued, increased road capacity did not mean actual
improvement for road trafﬁc. They also explained that counter-
acting measures would keep the trafﬁc down. Furthermore, there
will be yearly evaluations of goal achievements and, if the results
are not satisfactory, road tolls will be increased and access to
parking further reduced. A transport planner working for the NPRA
saw this differently. He explained that road capacity expansions
were necessary to allow changes to the local street network that
would reduce current congestion, as well as prevent future
congestion on the trunk roads.
In response to a direct question concerning why induced trafﬁc
caused by new road capacity was not included in estimations of the
effects of the total package (MoT, 2008b), one planner explained
this as due to uncertainties related to effects of the combination of
measures included in the Trondheim Package. There is no
documented knowledge of the probable effects of this combination
of measures, he claimed. Hence, it cannot be said with any
certainty that increased road capacity would cause growth in road
trafﬁc volumes in this particular case. This could be understood as
an example of characteristics of the expert knowledge in question
contributing to measures being introduced that reduce the goal
achievement potential of the plan. Effects of measures are context
dependent, and empirical evidence is not available for all
combinations in all contexts. Planners can therefore claim that
the effects of a particular combination of measures in a particular
context are uncertain. This is reinforced by the lack of good
methods for ex-ante assessments of combinations of measures.
When pushed, planners working on the Trondheim Package
explained that local politicians were convinced the planned roads
were necessary and desirable if objectives other than reducing
trafﬁc volumes were to be achieved, and that there would be no
point in trying to persuade them otherwise. Furthermore, income
from the toll cordon was a basis for the Trondheim Package;
without new roads in the package there could be no political
agreement on a toll cordon. The planners aimed at producing the
best possible package within these frames, bringing about as much
reduction in trafﬁc and GHG emissions as feasible. Two planners
explaining that the Trondheim Package developed from discus-
sions on how two large-scale road projects could be implemented
felt that the process had led to substantial improvements. In the
previous transport package, 75 percent of the income was used for
roads, so using 50 percent of this package for roads was an
improvement.
Several planners were sceptical about whether the densiﬁca-
tion strategies were ambitious enough to contribute to reducingtrafﬁc volumes. The same planners claimed that the politicians had
shown little willingness in ensuring implementation of the
densiﬁcation strategies in concrete zoning plans, mainly because
this could hamper growth and development in the city. They hoped
that including the densiﬁcation strategy in the Trondheim Package
would help contribute to changing this, but commented that it had
not happened so far. There were no signs that planners had made
any effort to use the expert knowledge in question to explain to the
politicians that a stricter densiﬁcation strategy would beneﬁt the
goal achievement potential of the Trondheim Package. On self-
reﬂection, planners at the planning authorities realised that they
could have been more pro-active by, for instance, analysing and
demonstrating the densiﬁcation potential in the public transport
corridor.
Almost all planners emphasised that they need to adjust the
solutions they propose to politicians and politics. When deciding
which strategies and measures to suggest in the Trondheim
Package, they based their assessments on a mix of the expert
knowledge in question and their knowledge of local politics. One
understanding of why trafﬁc-increasing road expansions and land-
use developments were included in the Trondheim Package could
hence be that the main goal was partly ousted by other
objectives. The expert knowledge in question was ousted when
planners exercised self-censorship because they understood that
this knowledge did not supported measures and strategies that
political decision-makers prioritised. There were no indications of
actors explicitly rejecting or disagreeing with the expert knowl-
edge in question.
5.1.6. Whether and how use and non-use of the expert knowledge
affected the goal achievement potential of the Trondheim Package
The Trondheim Package states ambitious and clear goals
concerning reductions in trafﬁc volumes and GHG emission from
transport. A number of measures are included contributing
positively to the goal achievement potential of the package as
well as strategies and measures contributing negatively.
The expert knowledge was introduced in the plan-making
processes mainly as embedded in the planners making the plans.
There are clear indications that knowledge creep or an enlighten-
ment process has taken place over decades seems strongly related
to the fact that planners learn from each other in various ways. To
some degree, knowledge has also been introduced through
planners reading scientiﬁc and popular scientiﬁc literature, and
through their readings of government policy documents and
planning guidelines.
There are clear indications that planners’ use of the expert
knowledge in question inﬂuenced the plan-making processes in
ways contributing to coordination of land-use and transport
planning, and to inclusion of trafﬁc-reducing measures. The main
mechanism through which this occurred was that this expert
knowledge was the main basis for planners’ knowing and acting.
Moreover, the planners actively used the expert knowledge when
explaining cause–effect relations in various documents, and as
arguments for restrictive measures being included. On a few
occasions, the planners turned to the expert knowledge for help in
solving their planning problem, primarily by searching for
empirical data.
When counter-productive measures were included in the
package, this was due not to the planners not understanding that
these would reduce the goal achievement potential of the plan, but
rather to their understanding that political decision-makers, for
various reasons, were convinced that including these measures
was necessary. The planners found it pointless to explain or argue
that this would negatively affect the goal achievement potential of
the package, and therefore did not meet the proposals with
knowledge-based analyses, arguments or explanations. It might
Table 2
Measures included in the Master Plan for Lund and our assessments of whether they
contribute to or counteract the goal achievement potential of the plan (focusing on
reducing GHG emissions from transport).
Elements included in the plan How this affects the goal
achievement potential
75 percent of housing development
planned on new land outside the main
city’s borders; new workplaces are to
be located in a similar pattern
Contributes to increasing
trafﬁc volumes
Developing local centres and the city
centre, strict policies towards
external and semi-external locations
of new retail development
Contributes to reducing
trafﬁc volumes
New public transport infrastructure,
improving public transport services
Contributes to reducing
trafﬁc volumes
Improving the bicycle network Contributes to reducing
trafﬁc volumes
New roads, increased road capacity Contributes to increasing
trafﬁc volumes
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ousted when planners understood that the implications were not
acceptable in – or threatening to – the local political context.
Another way of expressing this is that the objective ‘reducing
trafﬁc volumes’ was ousted by other objectives (completing the
ring road system, draining trafﬁc from the city centre). Further-
more, aspects of the expert knowledge allowed planners to argue
that road expansion would not necessarily contribute to increasing
trafﬁc volumes, and this weakens their foundations for convinc-
ingly explaining the trafﬁc-increasing effects to decision-makers.
5.2. The Master Plan for Lund, Sweden
5.2.1. Introducing the Lund case
This case regards the overall planning processes for the Master
Plan in Lund in Sweden. Lund is located in the largest populated
region in the Nordic countries, close to Malmo¨ in Sweden and
Copenhagen in Denmark. The municipality has a growing
population of 110,000 inhabitants and the city is home to Lund
University, which is the largest in the Nordic countries (47,000
students and 7200 employees).
Analyses of the Lund case are based on document analyses,
analyses of previous research, and interviews with planners
specialised in trafﬁc planning and architectural city planning,
two of whom speciﬁcally for this paper. We also draw on
interviews conducted in relation to other research projects
covering similar topics.
Two complementary planning documents have been taken into
account in the analyses, the main one being the municipal Master
Plan (later we use the term ‘‘Master Plan’’ for short) (Municipality
of Lund (MoL), 2010). LundaMaTs II (strategy for a sustainable
transport system in Lund 2030) is included as background material
(termed Transport Strategy in the discussions) (Ryde`n, Wendle,
Neergaard, Ljungberg, & Bengtsson, 2005). It was developed for,
and in cooperation with, Lund municipality by a consultancy ﬁrm
and has had a central role in transport development in Lund, and to
a certain degree in land-use development, over a long period of
time (Holmberg, 2008).
5.2.2. The goal achievement potential of the Master Plan for Lund
The planners claim that there is consensus among the political
parties to strive towards sustainability. This is important, since
political colours can shift after elections. Planners believe that
politicians, regardless of which parties are in power, have a stated
goal that Lund should change in more sustainable directions, and
that plans should be designed in ways that contribute to this.
According to the planners, these intentions have existed for the
past 30 years.
The vision of the Master Plan for Lund is ‘‘sustainable
development based on the Brundtland Commission’s deﬁnition
of sustainable development, which is development that meets
present needs without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet their own needs. The Master Plan will
contribute to a sustainable society economically, socially, environ-
mentally and culturally’’ (MoL, 2010:13, our translation). The
Master Plan states that development of Lund and its satellites
should contribute to reducing CO2 emissions in the municipality by
85 percent before 2050; however, no quantiﬁed goals have been
set for reducing trafﬁc volumes. The Master Plan refers to an
underlying climate analysis ﬁnding that trafﬁc volumes need to
be reduced by 50 percent if the 85 percent CO2 reduction is to be
reached. The plan presents 134 statements about what needs to
be achieved to contribute to the vision setting the directions for
planning and development. Some of the statements could be
understood as sub-goals of the Master Plan, others as measures or
strategies by which the deﬁned goals can be achieved. Land-use isto be developed preferably as densiﬁcation in locations well
covered by public transport, and with densities high enough to
sustain local shopping and service facilities. New workplace and
visitor-intensive workplaces should be located at sites with good
public transport access, and the municipality will be strict in its
attitude to the external and semi-external location of groceries and
other shopping facilities. Public transport would be the backbone
of new urban developments. Before construction of new transport
infrastructure is considered, trafﬁc-reducing measures or mea-
sures improving the efﬁciency of the existing infrastructure have to
be considered. The main bicycle network should be given priority,
and a new policy on car parking drawn up.
On examining the Master Plan and planning map, one may
question the densiﬁcation strategy. For instance, when concretis-
ing housing development strategies, the ﬁgures show that only
200 out of 780 new housing units per year are planned as
densiﬁcation in Lund itself and its larger satellites (the closest
satellites are located about 6, 7 and 14 km, respectively, from the
periphery of Lund city) (MoL, 2010:24). This means that almost
75 percent of new housing is planned on undeveloped land as what
we would term ‘‘sprawl’’, even though it is emphasised that new
developments are to be dense. It is argued that in order to reduce
transport demands new workplaces should be developed in a
similar pattern. The plan sums up the need for new land for
developments at 1730 hectares over the next 20 years (MoL,
2010:25).
A light rail link (Lundala¨nken) is under construction, improving
public transport accessibility within the city and eventually to
some of the satellites. A new railway line is planned, connecting at
least two of the satellites with the main city centre. Several minor
and one major road-building project are shown on the planning
map, as well as several road improvements.
An impact assessment was conducted as part of the Master Plan
(MoL, 2010). Three alternatives were assessed and compared:
continue as before (the zero or do-nothing alternative), trafﬁc
reduction, and the Master Plan proposal. The impact assessment
concluded that the Master Plan proposal contributed least to
achievement of the CO2 reduction goal, this among other reasons
because of more car-dependent land-use development. Mitigating
measures proposed are introduction of a stricter parking policy and
development of the least car-dependent areas ﬁrst.
As summarised in Table 2, our assessment of the Master Plan is
in line with the impact assessment. In total, it cannot be expected
that implementation of the plan will contribute to reducing trafﬁc
volumes and CO2 emissions; rather, it is more likely to increase
them. It therefore seems that the goal achievement potential of the
plan is low if the focus is CO2 reduction.
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track of goal achievements. The 2011 report shows good ﬁgures
with respect to several of the indicators (MoL, 2011) and that road
trafﬁc distance per person is unchanged (compared to 2004), while
there has been a 1 percent increase in the municipal network. Since
the population of Lund is growing, the total trafﬁc volumes are
increasing as well.
5.2.3. Mechanisms through which the expert knowledge was
introduced
The planning processes in Lund are characterised by the use of
different kinds of knowledge from a number of sources. In taking
account of context, the planners explained that they used various
methods and sources such as forecasts, population statistics,
surveys and meetings with citizens. They referred to national and
international policy documents in the Master Plan, for instance the
‘2 degree goal’ and the ‘Brundtland Report’. Furthermore, the
Master Plan refers extensively to earlier municipal plans.
The expert knowledge in question is important as well.
Interviewees said that planners in Lund had long been taking an
integrated sustainability approach and that this had affected
politicians’ ways of thinking (see also Hrelja & Nyberg, 2012).
Knowledge and methods of integrated land-use and transport
planning are used right from the very beginning of planning
processes. Planners rely on academic knowledge from their
university education, and they learn from each other. One central
method facilitating knowledge-sharing has been the mixing
together of planners with different academic backgrounds and
specialties. In this way, land-use planners have learned to consider
issues related to transport systems development and trafﬁc when
planning land-use, and vice versa. As an efﬁcient way of sharing
knowledge, the municipality produces handbooks, such as the
Handbook for Trafﬁc Reducing Societal Planning (MoL, 2004), and has
carried out self-assessments with external evaluators analysing
their ongoing work. Hence, an important way in which the expert
knowledge in question is brought into planning processes is
through being embedded in planners involved. They possess this
knowledge, it seems, through knowledge-sharing and knowledge
creep over the years.
There are few, if any, references in the Master Plan to written
academic literature on the expert knowledge in question, but there
are references to the handbook ‘Trafﬁc for Attractive Cities’
published by the National Transport Agency (2007). The examined
plan has a proper reference list of non-academic literature and
data, although not for all knowledge claims, in particular for
statistical data regarding context, state and current development.
The planners actively gain new knowledge from experts from the
outside. One interviewee explained that researchers at Lund
University were invited to make speciﬁc evaluations in the early
stages of plan-making. Furthermore, the municipality hired
consultants to assess speciﬁc issues where they lacked expertise,
or where they wanted external opinions. Planners also gain new
knowledge by participating at conferences and workshops, making
ﬁeld trips to other countries and analysing evaluations of similar
projects in municipalities worldwide (Ryde`n et al., 2005). The
planners believe that Lund is at the forefront when it comes to
integrated land-use and transport planning in Sweden, and
therefore ﬁnd it necessary to look abroad for good examples
and new knowledge.
5.2.4. Mechanisms through which use of expert knowledge
contributed to coordination and inclusion of trafﬁc-reducing measures
The expert knowledge in question is apparent in various ways
in the planning documents examined. Both the Transport Strategy
and the Master Plan discuss land-use, development of transport
systems, and how these affect each other and developments oftrafﬁc volumes and/or GHG emissions from trafﬁc. For instance,
the ﬁrst of 18 indicators listed in the Transport Strategy concerns
the location of new residences in the municipality. The planners
readily discuss these issues in interviews, which might indicate
that this knowledge is a main basis for the planners’ knowing and
acting.
In the impact assessment of the Master Plan, theoretical
knowledge claims as well as empirical knowledge embedded in the
expert knowledge in question were used in explaining how and
why the proposed plan has negative effects with respect to the CO2
reduction goal. The main method in the impact assessment is
professional reasoning, supplemented by quantitative calcula-
tions. There are few, if any, examples of planners referencing more
actively to the expert knowledge in question. The impact assessment
in the Master Plan can be understood as an example of the expert
knowledge used as an argument. This is because the assessment,
based on the expert knowledge in question, argues that the
proposed plan counteracts achievement of the stated main
objective.
5.2.5. Mechanisms through which counter-productive measures were
included
It is clear from the planning documents that the CO2 emissions
reduction target includes reducing trafﬁc volumes. An underlying
analysis had suggested that a 50 percent reduction in total trafﬁc
volumes would be necessary if the CO2 emissions target was to be
achieved. Hence, when the plan proposes land-use development
and urban road capacity expansions clearly contributing to growth
in trafﬁc volumes, it is not due to an absence of objectives
concerning this issue.
A more obvious explanation is that this objective was ousted by
other objectives. The preface of the Master Plan states: ‘‘In order to
achieve a socially sustainable society, the Master Plan is to
facilitate for the construction of 900 housing units per year’’ (MoL,
2010:3). The impact assessment of the Master Plan explains that
there is conﬂict between the CO2 reduction objective and
objectives concerning the conservation of land for food production.
It is concluded: ‘‘this goal conﬂict requires that measures in other
sectors are necessary to achieve the CO2 emission reduction target’’
(MoL, 2010:42). The combination of high demand for new housing,
combined with strict conservation regulations, might explain why
the plan proposes this land-use development.
The impact assessment could be understood as a way of using
expert knowledge to explain to politicians how the proposed plan
does not contribute to achieving the deﬁned objectives. Nonethe-
less, the assessment does not refer to empirical studies demon-
strating that the proposed land-use development would cause
increased transport demand and car-use. Furthermore, the
suggestions for mitigating measures do not include alternatives
offered by the expert knowledge in question. This could be to
intensify the densiﬁcation strategy and reduce land-take, or to give
priority to the location of specialised workplaces in more central
locations. However, it did suggest development of the least car-
dependent areas ﬁrst.
It could hardly be argued that lack of empirical evidence in the
expert knowledge might help explain the introduction of counter-
effective measures with respect to reduced trafﬁc volumes and
GHG emissions. Interrelations between spatial urban structures
and trafﬁc volumes have been investigated over decades and in
numerous locations and contexts, and the evidence is compelling.
In this case, the planners may be inﬂuenced by planning myths (as
discussed in Section 4.3). One could claim that one such planning
myth is that employees at suburban workplaces have on average
shorter commuting distances than employees of centrally located
workplaces because people live close to where they work. Even
though several authors argue that this is the case (Crane &
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1993), there is little evidence in the Nordic countries of any such
overall tendency. Several Nordic studies have instead found that
workplaces and housing located in the periphery of cities, even if
located close to public transport stops, generate more trafﬁc than
centrally located workplaces (e.g. Hartoft-Nielsen, 2001a, 2001b;
Næss, 2006a, 2012; Strømmen, 2001). It seems that this myth is a
basis for knowing and acting in the Lund Master Plan, since new
housing and workplaces are planned in all satellites. Furthermore,
it could be taken from explanations in the plan that planners
believe they can achieve low car shares in suburban areas if they
improve public transport and other local services. The planners
were surprised when analyses demonstrated that this may not be
the case, even in the highly proﬁled Brunnsho¨g area, which is the
development area closest to the city centre. These ﬁndings could be
interpreted as the expert knowledge in question was ousted by other
knowledge (myths). Furthermore, there are no discussions in the
Master Plan concerning the trafﬁc-inducing effect of road capacity
expansions.
The planners argued that the overall strategies of the Master
Plan are not counterproductive with respect to the GHG
emissions objectives, and that it strives towards sustainability.
This could be understood as if properties of the planners caused
that they were not able to understand that the proposed land-use
development was counter-productive to the CO2 reduction
objective. However, the planners also explain that population
growth requires development in the outer parts of the munici-
pality, which increases the transport demand and possibly also
car usage. The municipality aims at mitigating the trafﬁc increase
by strengthening public transport, among others ways by
building the new light rail line, and by developing services and
workplaces in the satellites. Hence, while planners argue that the
strategies contribute to goal achievement, they are at the same
time aware of the contradictions in the planning documents. The
planners emphasise that plans are not produced by planners
alone, but involve political and democratic processes with other
stakeholders.
One way of dealing with conﬂicting goals and counter-
productive measures is to develop different alternatives, and
three were included in the impact assessment in the Master Plan
(as described above). One planner argued that this allows decision-
makers to understand the consequences of the plans before they
adopt them, to vote for the less trafﬁc-increasing plan if they found
this to be an important objective, or to ask the planners to come up
with better alternatives if none were acceptable.
5.2.6. Whether and how the use and non-use of the expert knowledge
affected the goal achievement potential of the Master Plan for Lund
The Lund Master Plan states clear objectives concerning to
reduce GHG emissions from transport, and acknowledges that this
includes curbing trafﬁc growth. The plan does, however, present
land-use and transport systems developments strategies contrib-
uting to increase car-use and trafﬁc volumes and thus the goal
achievement potential with respect to the CO2 emissions reduction
goal is low.
When analysing whether and how use and non-use of the
expert knowledge in question affected the goal achievement
potential of the examined plans, the ﬁndings are contradictory.
Planners’ explanations concerning cause–effect relations in the
plan are in many ways in accordance with the expert knowledge,
and are a basis for coordinating land-use and transport planning
and for including trafﬁc-reducing measures. Still, their explana-
tions for including counteracting measures in the plan are more in
accordance with the planning myth that employees at suburban
workplaces on average generate less trafﬁc than employees at
centrally located workplaces. It seems as if this planning myth hasousted the expert knowledge in question and been used as part of
the basis for knowing and acting when making the plan.
Furthermore, the Master Plan raises no concerns about the
trafﬁc-inducing effects of road capacity expansions.
During interviews the planners explained that planning
processes are politically driven and involve actors other than
planners. Furthermore, they explained that the Master Plan states
several objectives – some contradictory. However, the planners did
not feel that they were overruled by politicians on the matter of the
land-use development strategy.
5.3. The Master Plan for Aarhus, Denmark
5.3.1. Introducing the Aarhus case
The Aarhus case is the planning process relating to the
2009 Master Plan. With more than 300,000 inhabitants in the
municipality, Aarhus is the second largest city in Denmark and is
capital of the Middle Jutland Region. It is a university city with
about 40,000 students and 11,000 university employees. The
polycentric East Jutland region, where Aarhus is the biggest city,
has about 1.2 million inhabitants.
The case description and analyses are based on document
studies and interviews with municipal and public transport
planners engaged in the planning process. The documents
examined as part of the case study are the Aarhus Municipal
Master Plan 2009 (Municipality of Aarhus (MoA), 2009) (hereafter
termed Master Plan) and the Environmental Impact Assessment of
the Master Plan 2009 (COWI, 2008) (hereafter termed EIA). In this
last document, a consultancy agency was engaged to assess
whether the formulated strategies in the Master Plan would
minimise road-based trafﬁc and GHG emissions as well as other
consequences of the plan.
The 2009 Master Plan process was the ﬁrst Danish planning
process following the 2007 Regional reform in the Danish
Government. It resulted in increased spatial planning responsibili-
ties for the municipalities. The 2009 Master Plan is also the ﬁrst
Danish planning process where urban and regional land-use
planning were integrated with planning of a public transport
project (a light rail infrastructure).
Aarhus has high ambitions regarding CO2 reductions. The City
Council has signed the Covenant of Mayors, by which about
500 European cities voluntarily committed to reducing their
energy consumption by 20 percent by 2020. In 2009, the City
Council signed an EU-founded agreement on a Sustainable Energy
Action Plan for Aarhus to become a CO2 neutral city by 2030. The
Master Plan refers to this goal several times, stating that spatial
development of Aarhus and development of the transport systems
should be planned in accordance with this objective (MoA,
2009:12, 146). It is stated that strategies in the plan would
actually contribute to minimising transport demands. At present,
25 percent of the CO2 emissions in Aarhus municipality are
produced by transport (MoA, 2009:13).
The process of formulating the Master Plan 2009 was under-
taken by a steering group constituted by the heads of departments
of Urban Planning and Construction, Nature and Environment and
Trafﬁc and Roads. Several public hearings took place during the
planning process, and arenas were set up to facilitate the
participation of private stakeholders central to ﬁnancing and to
the realisation of various projects.
5.3.2. The goal achievement potential of the Master Plan for Aarhus
For the past few decades, the main trends in Aarhus have been
growth in the number of workplaces in the city centre, and
increasing prices for housing in the proximity of the city centre
(MoA, 2009). These trends, together with objectives related to
minimising trafﬁc volumes, have stressed the need for a new
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opment. In the 2009 Master Plan, this has been translated to high
density, mixed-use ‘new towns’ located 9–24 km outside the city
centre, and transformation of already urbanised areas to high-
density and multi-purpose areas. This is integrated with planning
of a new light rail as the new public transport artery reorganising
the future metropolitan development of the Aarhus city region. The
new towns will have excellent access to the main road system, and
several road construction projects expanding urban road capacity
are included in the plan. The Master Plan argues that this is
necessary in order to accommodate the expected growth in trafﬁc
volumes. There are no suggestions concerning reduction of parking
accessibility, or any other restrictive measures. The Master Plan
stresses that the combination of high-density neighbourhoods,
mixed-use and accessibility to the future light rail stops will favour
non-motorised travel behaviour and public transport, hence
limiting road trafﬁc.
The Master Plan states that urban transformation, mainly on
brownﬁeld areas (harbour front) and as inﬁll, has potential
corresponding to 35 percent of residential developments and
70 percent of business developments in the plan (MoA, 2009). This
means that about 65 percent of new residences and 30 percent of
new workplaces are planned for development on new land, most of
it fairly distant from the city centre. The urbanised areas in the
municipality will increase by 20 percent (1030 ha) if the Master
Plan is realised.
These planning strategies were assessed in the EIA, and
compared to a zero-alternative with concentric urban expansion
(COWI, 2008). The EIA concluded that the Master Plan could be
understood as producing a little less trafﬁc than the zero-
alternative, but that this would depend on a number of uncertain
factors. The EIA consultants discussed whether the two alter-
natives would contribute to the CO2 emissions reduction referred
to in the Master Plan. Their analyses, mainly conducted as
professional reasoning, concluded that both alternatives would
probably contribute to increasing rather than reducing car trafﬁc
volumes.
When assessing the goal achievement potential of the Master
Plan in light of the expert knowledge described in Section 3, we
agree with this conclusion. The main strategies concern develop-
ment of most new residences and a substantial number of
workplaces in new towns 9–24 km from the city centre, with no
restrictions on road trafﬁc suggested. Instead, the road capacity
will be expanded to facilitate for an expected growth in trafﬁc. Our
assessments are summarised in Table 3.Table 3
Main measures included in the Aarhus Master Plan 2009 and our assessments of
whether they contribute to or counteract the goal achievement potential of the plan
(with respect to reducing GHG emissions from transport).
Elements included in the plan How this affects goal
achievement potential
High density, mixed use ‘new towns’
located 9–24 km from the city centre
and close to the future light rail stops
and the main road system (65 percent
of new housing, 30 percent of new
workplaces)
Contributes to increasing
trafﬁc volumes
Inner city densiﬁcation and
transformation
Contributes to reducing trafﬁc
volumes
The light rail project Contributes to reducing trafﬁc
volumes
Improve facilities for bicycling Contributes to reducing trafﬁc
volumes
Road capacity increasing projects Contributes to increasing
trafﬁc volumes
Parking policies (if not changed) Contributes to increasing
trafﬁc volumes5.3.3. Mechanisms through which the expert knowledge was
introduced
Various kinds of knowledge, from different kinds of sources, were
used when producing the Aarhus Master Plan. There are references to
European political agreements, and to plans and policy documents at
international, governmental, municipal and project level. The plan
presents ﬁgures concerning current states and prognoses with
respect to population, dwellings, public transport and GHG
emissions, although rarely are there references to speciﬁc docu-
ments. In interviews, urban planners demonstrated local knowledge
about the context and politics surrounding urban planning.
The expert knowledge in question was brought into the planning
processes through different mechanisms. One was learning from
other planners through direct exchanges. In interviews, planners
explained that their knowledge developed through the long-term
planning process, especially with respect to light rail, since this was
the ﬁrst light rail project in Denmark. The planners actively searched
for knowledge concerning other cases of European provincial cities
building light rail. They organised study trips and visited other
planners and policy actors in German and French cities where light
rail had been constructed in the previous decade, citing this as
valuable experience. Important to urban planners, public transport
planners, consultants, policy actors and politicians was the idea that
light rail could become an artery for regional development in the
Aarhus area. The understanding that land-use and transport
planning needed to be integrated was a main basis for the design
of the plan. This understanding, it seems, was brought into the
planning process as embedded in the planners involved.
It seems that knowledge, particularly concerning how land-use
and transport systems development affect travel distances and
modal choices (the expert knowledge in question in this case), was
introduced to the planning process mainly by experts from outside,
namely the EIA consultants. The EIA analyses demonstrate that this
kind of knowledge is embedded in the EIA consultants, and that
this is their ﬁeld of expertise. The consultants combine the expert
knowledge in question with context knowledge extracted from the
Master Plan proposal and other sources (COWI, 2008). They refer to
previous plans, policy documents and statistics, as well as to
research syntheses and a few scientiﬁc works – Hartoft-Nielsen’s
(2001a, 2001b) works in particular concerning how the location of
activities in the spatial structure affects trafﬁc volumes and GHG
emissions. Aarhus was one of the cities examined in these works.
Another example of scientiﬁc evidence brought into the planning
process is empirical knowledge concerning the effects of car-use in
other Danish cities that have carried out similar strategies as
proposed in the Master Plan.
It seems that a knowledge creep was going on in municipal
planning circles in Aarhus at the time the plan was made. Planners
were learning from each other, from planners and planning
elsewhere, as well as from specialists in various technical and
specialised ﬁelds.
5.3.4. Mechanisms through which use of expert knowledge
contributed to coordination and inclusion of trafﬁc-reducing measures
The Aarhus Master Plan 2009 focuses strongly on integration of
land-use and public transport developments, and on minimising
transport demands and use of the private car, while at the same
time facilitating mobility demands. The necessity of seeing these
elements in relation to each other seems to be part of the planners’
basis for knowing and acting. The expert knowledge in question is
used for explaining cause–effect relations. The Master Plan explains
how short distances to shopping and services, as well as improved
public transport services and better facilitation for cycling, may
increase the modal shares for other modes than the car. This forms
strong arguments for implementing the light rail as a trafﬁc-
reducing measure.
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the primary basis for the knowing and acting of the planners
(consultants) producing the EIA. They make use of it to explain the
main interrelations, as well as how and why some of the proposed
strategies and measures will not contribute to minimising road
trafﬁc and achieving the CO2 emissions reduction goal. Further-
more, the EIA explains the interrelations between restrictive
measures for car trafﬁc and trafﬁc volumes. The EIA could be
understood as planners arguing that the strategies in the Master
Plan will not contribute to achieving the deﬁned objectives (even
though this is not clearly expressed in the document). It could also
be claimed that planners making the EIA used the expert
knowledge as a ‘body of reference’, giving their knowledge claims,
explanations and arguments extra weight.
5.3.5. Mechanisms through which counter-productive measures were
included
Main strategies or measures reducing the goal achievement
potential of the Master Plan for Aarhus are the extensive urban
expansion on new land far from the city centre and the road
capacity expansions included in the plan.
The Master Plan claims that development of new towns
between 9 and 24 km from Aarhus city centre would contribute
to minimising local transport demands. The plan mentions that
housing and workplaces located this far from the city centre tend
to generate more trafﬁc than more central locations, but explains
that good access to daily services, combined with light rail, would
reduce this effect. These claims are partly anchored in the expert
knowledge in question. However, they disregard the theoretical
and empirical knowledge concerning that the location of activities
this far from the city centre and the main city, as well as increased
urban road capacity, contribute to increase transport demands and
car-use (as discussed in Section 3). The argumentation may be
inﬂuenced by the planning myth that employees at suburban
workplaces have shorter commuting distances than employees at
centrally located workplaces because people live close to where
they work, as discussed in the Lund case.
It is explained in the EIA how and why the land-use strategies
proposed in the Master Plan would be counter-effective with
respect to achieving the goals of minimising trafﬁc and reducing
CO2 emissions (MoA, 2010:127). Moreover, differences between
the assessed zero-alternative with an improved bus system and the
proposed light rail are very small. Municipal and public transport
planners ﬁnd that the real beneﬁts of light rail cannot be assessed
in this way, but rather on how the combination of land-use and
transport development bring long-term achievements such as
quality of life and air quality. This cannot be calculated with any
degree of certainty in a long-term perspective.
Municipal planners are aware of the understanding that new
town developments generates more trafﬁc, among other because
of dialogues with Aalborg University and other experts on the case
matter. One municipal planner explained during the interview that
developments included in the plan facilitated the reduction of car
trafﬁc only to a certain degree. The light rail needs to be understood
as a ﬁrst step towards more sustainable mobility patterns in
Aarhus. Municipal and public transport planners agree that
measures other than those proposed in the 2009 Master Plan
should be implemented to actually reduce car trafﬁc in the city.
There seem to be no reﬂections in the Master Plan, or in the
interviews, on the trafﬁc-inducing effects of expanding the road
capacity, which could be interpreted as the municipal planners not
being aware of this effect. The Master Plan does not introduce
stricter regulations regarding parking access, but the planners
pointed out in interviews that parking restrictions would probably
be necessary if road trafﬁc was to be minimised. They had not
made any serious effort to get this included in the 2009 MasterPlan, but found that parking restrictions would probably be
introduced in future plans.
The combining of light rail with new towns has been a
compelling planning idea that has engaged municipal and public
transport planners, as well as local politicians, in a common vision
for urban development in Aarhus. This may have shaped new
knowledge between two diverse planning sectors which over time
has formed a new objective around the city-regional development
of Aarhus, rather than of minimising trafﬁc and becoming a CO2
neutral city by 2030. The expert knowledge in question may have
been understood as threatening to the light rail project and may
therefore have been disregarded.
Another explanation could be that the political decision-makers
were not really concerned about the GHG emissions reduction
objective. Decision-makers could have put more weight on other
stated goals, and the planners may have been aware of this. If
politicians found the proposed Master Plan to be contributing to
the fulﬁlment of competing goals, or that introducing restrictive
measures on road trafﬁc would counteract such goals, this could be
an explanation as to why the planners introduced trafﬁc-
increasing measures in the plan. The planners did not imply this
in the interviews.
In this case, it seems more as if the planners have promoted
what they understand as good principles for urban development in
Aarhus, and have not really focused on trafﬁc minimization or CO2
reduction as a prominent planning objective. Consequently, the
explanations and arguments in the EIA regarding trafﬁc-increasing
effects of the plan may not have been regarded as relevant. In that
case, a primary mechanism through which counteracting mea-
sures have been included in the plan is that the objective of
‘minimising trafﬁc’ was ousted by other objectives and ideas.
5.3.6. Whether and how use and non-use of the expert knowledge
affected the goal achievement potential of the Master Plan for Aarhus
All the involved parties seemed to agree that the integration of
land-use and transport planning was obvious and correct in this
case, and that this is based on understandings in the expert
knowledge in question. There are important elements in the plan
that positively contribute to the goal achievement potential of the
plan with respect to reducing trafﬁc volumes and GHG emissions,
but also strong elements contributing negatively to it (new towns,
increased road capacity). The EIA explains these effects, but the
municipal planners do not seem to have emphasised this.
One explanation could have been that the planners relied on
other kinds of research-based knowledge when claiming that the
new towns would generate less trafﬁc. Neither the Master Plan
nor the interviewees presented any empirical evidence or
documented knowledge underpinning this assumption. Another
explanation might be that the planners were inﬂuenced instead
by planning myths, as discussed in the Lund case, and trusted
these. There seems to have been low awareness that road capacity
expansion contributes to increased trafﬁc volumes, which leads to
another explanation, namely that powerful planners are not
specialised in coordinated land-use and transport planning for
reducing trafﬁc volumes, and hence are not highly skilled in this
respect.
In this case it seems that the strongest mechanism is planners
and decision-makers agreeing on the compelling idea of combining
the light rail project with developing new towns, and saw this as a
promising future for urban development in Aarhus. In this
situation, elements of expert knowledge demonstrating that this
would not contribute to achieving the overarching goal of reducing
GHG emissions and minimising trafﬁc were unwelcome or
understood as not relevant. Hence, it was disregarded. It seems
there was low awareness that road capacity expansions contrib-
uted to increasing trafﬁc volumes.
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The goal formulations in two of the three case cities are
somewhat vague in terms of trafﬁc volume reductions. Only
Trondheim has an explicit goal. Aarhus has a goal of minimising
trafﬁc volumes, but this is a very ‘elastic’ formulation. When can
something be said to have been minimised? Obviously, minimising
does not mean reducing to zero; rather, it means reducing ‘as much
as possible’. But then, what is possible is a matter of judgement and
trade-off. In Lund, there is an ambitious long-term goal of reducing
CO2 emissions by 85 percent over the next four decades, but no
adopted goal concerning trafﬁc reduction. As mentioned earlier,
there is instead reference to a background document stating that a
50 percent reduction in trafﬁc volumes is necessary if this goal is to
be reached. There is, however, no further indication of how much
of this is to be achieved through changes in the modal split and/or
by reduced mobility levels, or how large a contribution to any
changes in mobility levels land-use development is supposed to
bring about compared with other possible measures such as road
pricing.
According to Sager (1991), goals can have different functions:
steering, legitimating and propagandistic. In politics, goals are
often not meant to be steering, but instead propagandistic (i.e.
functioning mainly to brand the political regime as modern and
responsible, environmentally aware, etc.) It should be noted that
ambivalence can sometimes be conducive to transition towards
sustainability, as it permits and facilitates forms of movement,
change, ﬂexibility and reinterpretation that such transitions will
undoubtedly require (Walker & Shove, 2007:223). According to
Christensen, Morsing, and Thyssen (2013), so-called ‘‘eco-talk’’ or
aspirational talk might be understood as helping channelling
practices to more sustainable actions.
Notwithstanding any inconsistency of the stated quantitative
objectives with other adopted policies, or the vagueness of
formulations like ‘minimising trafﬁc volumes’, it is still highly
relevant to examine how planners’ use and non-use of expert
knowledge in plan-making affect the contents and goal achieve-
ment potentials of plans.
5.5. Comparative analyses and generalisations
Based on the ﬁndings in internal analyses of the three cases, we
now conduct analyses across cases in order to distinguish theTable 4
Assessment of whether mechanisms deﬁned in Section 4 were important for the expe
Mechanisms Trondheim Lund 
Brought in as embedded in
planners involved
Yes, through highly skilled and
experienced planners specialised in land-
use and transport planning
Yes, p
in Sw
Learning from other planners
in various ways
Clear indications that planners learn
from previous plans, and from working
with other planners
Consc
sharin
abroa
Brought in by experts from
outside the planning
agency
No references to this Resea
hired 
Knowledge creep affecting
basic understandings
Clear indications that knowledge creep
has taken place
Clear 
has ta
Readings of scientiﬁc works
and popular science
literature
References to two academic works in
interviews and to some research
syntheses in documents
Some
works
Readings of governmental
white papers, guidelines,
etc.
Several references to such documents,
but not an important mechanism
Sever
but n
Brought in by political
decision-makers, NGOs,
etc.
No references to this No remore important mechanisms and explanations from the less
important.
5.5.1. Mechanisms through which expert knowledge is introduced in
plans
Analyses of three cases revealed that the main mechanism
through which the expert knowledge in question was introduced
into planning processes was as embedded in knowledgeable
planners involved (see Table 4).
The planners had gained their insights in the expert knowledge
in several ways (see Table 4). In all cases, planners refer to how
they learn from other planners in their daily work, and we found
examples of deliberate institutional set-ups for knowledge-sharing
in all three cases. Planning documents refer to previous plans and
other relevant plans, which means that the planners learn from
what others have done before them. In some cases, expert
knowledge was introduced in the planning process through
experts directly contributing to the plan-making, or conducting
speciﬁc analyses, assessments and evaluations. Planners and
planning documents make frequent reference to international,
national, regional and local policy documents, especially when
explaining how objectives are deﬁned and given priority. A few
planners referred to their scholarly education. These ﬁndings
clearly indicate that planners form a community of practice
(Wenger, 1998). Much learning occurs as knowledge diffusion
(Shipan & Volden, 2008) internally in municipal planning
processes and ofﬁces, but also across cities within countries and
across borders, as described by planners in Lund and Aarhus.
Planners’ stories of how their own and others’ knowledge
evolves over time indicate that knowledge creep (Radaelli, 1995)
and enlightenment (Weiss, 1979) are important mechanisms
diffusing research-based knowledge into planning practice. As
far as the expert knowledge in question in this article is concerned,
it seems that knowledge creep has evolved to a higher level in
Trondheim than in the other cities. In all cases, planners stated that
political decision-makers also learn over time and change their
framing of problems and relevant solutions accordingly.
We found few references to research literature or to direct
exchanges with researchers, and therefore conclude that in our
cases this was not an important mechanism bringing the expert
knowledge in question into planning processes. This is in line with
ﬁndings in previous studies (Krizek et al., 2009; Owens, 2005;
Tennøy, 2012). None of the planners referred to situations wherert knowledge in question being introduced in the plan-making processes.
Aarhus
lanners claim to be at the forefront
eden on this issue
Yes, to a certain extent by municipal
planners, to a higher extent by the EIA
consultants
ious facilitation of knowledge-
g and learning from planners
d
Clear indications that planners learn
from each other, locally as well as from
examples from abroad
rchers and consultants had been
to contribute with analyses
Yes, through consultants making the EIA
indication that knowledge creep
ken place
It seems that knowledge creep was going
on in municipal planning circles
 references to popular science
 in documents
No such references in the Master Plan,
several references in the EIA
al references to such documents,
ot an important mechanism
Some references to such documents, but
not an important mechanism
ferences to this No references to this
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knowledge in question into the processes.
5.5.2. Mechanisms through which use of expert knowledge
contributes to increasing the goal achievement potential of plans
We turn now to the question of how use of the expert
knowledge in question contributes to increasing the goal
achievement potentials of plans. This is narrowed down to the
questions of how planners use such expert knowledge in ways
contributing to coordination of land-use and transport planning
and to the inclusion of trafﬁc-reducing measures and strategies in
plans.
We found that the main mechanism through which the expert
knowledge in question contributed to coordination and integration
of land-use and transport planning in all three cases was by virtue
of being the main basis for planners’ knowing and acting (Table 5).
The idea that coordinating or integrating land-use and transport
planning was necessary seems to be deeply embedded in the
planners’ professional knowledge, hence forming their primary
basis for knowing and acting (Scho¨n, 1983). This is a fundamental
and stated understanding in the plans and analyses examined,
including sectorial documents such as transport strategies and
land-use plans. The way most planners discuss various issues in
interviews implies that they see land-use and transport develop-
ments as indivisible, also when analysing for instance how public
transport services need to be developed if they are to achieve
deﬁned objectives. For other planners, expert knowledge concern-
ing, for example, transport infrastructure developments is their
main basis for knowing and acting. However, these planners also
recognise that land-use and transport systems development are
intimately related. The planners also used the expert knowledge
more explicitly as arguments for coordination, in explaining how
land-use developments and transport systems development are
causally interrelated with each other and with transport demands
and trafﬁc generation.
Being the basis for planners’ knowing and acting was also the
main mechanism through which planners chose to propose trafﬁc-
reducing measures and strategies in the plans. Planners know,
without much reﬂection, which measures can contribute to goal
achievement. For instance, the measure ‘improving conditions for
bicycling’ is included in all three plans, because planners know that
enhancing the conditions for cycling increases the chances that
people will cycle instead of using motorised transport.Table 5
Assessment of whether the mechanisms deﬁned in Section 4 were important for the exp
measures included in plans.
Mechanisms Trondheim Lund 
The expert knowledge in
question was the basis for
planners’ knowing and
acting
Clear indication that this was the case It see
The expert knowledge was
used for explaining cause–
effect relations
Yes, in several of the underlying plans
and analyses
Yes, in
docum
The expert knowledge was
used as arguments
Yes, for instance as arguments that the
toll cordon and parking restrictions were
necessary
Yes, f
public
invest
could
the la
Maste
Planners turned to the expert
knowledge for help in
solving their planning
problems
Not for ﬁnding solutions, but to some
degree for assessing suggested measures
Not fo
impac
The expert knowledge, as ‘a
body of knowledge’, was
used as reference
No, references were not made to either
written documents or to any ‘body of
knowledge’
Not in
docum
knowWhen making plans and analyses, planners needed to justify
why certain strategies and measures be included for certain
objectives to be achieved. For this, they used the expert knowledge
in question to explain cause–effects relations. These explanations
formed strong arguments in planning processes. We saw for
instance how planners in all our cases explained how and why
improving public transport services would contribute to reduced
car dependency and trafﬁc volumes, and at the same time improve
mobility. This was used as an argument for large infrastructure
investments in Lund and Aarhus. Empirical research ﬁndings were
used to some extent as evidence that certain measures would
contribute to the desired effects, and hence strengthen explana-
tion-based arguments, as was the case for instance when
Trondheim planners argued for stricter parking regulations.
The knowledge was used in assessments of the expected effects
of suggested measures and strategies in all three cases. In the
impact assessments in Lund and Aarhus, we saw clear examples of
planners using the expert knowledge when explaining causal
relations, for instance how and why urban development far from
the city centre contribute to higher transport demands and car-use
than more centrally located developments. In the Aarhus case,
consultants also used empirical research ﬁndings as evidence that
the proposed land-use could contribute to increased car-use. In the
Lund case, planners used this as an argument for suggesting
mitigating measures.
There were few, if any, examples of planners actively turning to
the expert knowledge in question for solving their planning
problems. It could be that planners do this more than shows up in
planning documents, but the interviews did not indicate that this
was the case. There were also few, if any, ﬁndings in the case
studies of planners using the expert knowledge per se as a
reference for legitimising and strengthening their knowledge
claims. One exception was the Aarhus consultants, who referred to
‘the body of knowledge’ as well as particular documents when
making the EIA (Table 5).
5.5.3. Mechanisms through which counter-productive measures are
included in plans
Analysis of the three plans revealed that all include measures
and strategies which, according to state-of-the-art knowledge,
clearly reduce their goal achievement potential. This was not
because the goal ‘reducing or curbing trafﬁc volumes’ was absent
in the processes. Rather, this was a stated and highlighted objectiveert knowledge in question affecting coordination taking place and trafﬁc-reducing
Aarhus
ms as if this was the case To a certain degree for the municipal
planners, clearly so for the EIA
consultants
 all the examined planning
ents
Yes, in the EIA, and to some degree in the
Master Plan
or instance as an argument for
 transport infrastructure
ments. The impact assessment
 be seen as an argument opposing
nd-use strategies proposed in the
r Plan
Yes, for instance as an argument why
light rail is a good investment. The EIA
could be seen as an argument opposing
the claim that the Master Plan
contributes to minimising transport
r ﬁnding solutions, but in the
t assessment
Not for ﬁnding solutions, but in the EIA
 the Master Plan, neither to
ents, nor to any ‘body of
ledge’
Yes, the EIA referred to this as a ‘body of
knowledge’, as well as to particular
documents
Table 6
Assessment of whether the mechanisms deﬁned in Section 4 were important when non-optimal and counter-productive measures were introduced in and included in plans.
Mechanisms Trondheim Lund Aarhus
The objective of ‘reducing
trafﬁc volumes’ was not
introduced
No, this was the main stated objective in
the Trondheim Package
No, this was a clearly stated objective No, the objective was stated
The objective was (partly)
ousted by other objectives
Yes, by objectives concerning completing
the ring road system in order to reduce
local environment problems, and to
ensure enough land for construction of
housing and businesses
Yes, by objectives concerning facilitation
for strong growth in housing combined
with a strong focus on soil conservation
Yes, the objective was not made
prominent in the plan-making, and was
ousted by objectives concerning
facilitating growth and making the city
more attractive
The expert knowledge was
not introduced
No, the expert knowledge is present in all
documents and most interviews, but
knowledge concerning trafﬁc-inducing
effects of urban road expansions was
downplayed
Parts of the expert knowledge were
introduced in the plan-making process,
other parts in the EIA, while knowledge
concerning trafﬁc-inducing effects of
urban road expansions was not
introduced in the Master Plan
Parts of the expert knowledge were
introduced in the plan-making process,
other parts in the EIA, while knowledge
concerning trafﬁc-inducing effects of
urban road expansions was not
introduced
The expert knowledge was
ousted by other knowledge
or disregarded
Yes, knowledgeable planners exercised
self-censorship when they found that
implications of the knowledge were
politically unacceptable
Yes, it seems that inﬂuential planners
were not experts with respect to this
knowledge, and that it hence was ousted
by ‘planning myths’
Yes, it seems that inﬂuential planners
were not expert with respect to this
knowledge, that it was ousted by
‘planning myths’, and disregarded when
it opposed the compelling planning idea
The expert knowledge was
wrongly applied
Perhaps in assessments on whether the
combination of measures would cause
trafﬁc reduction
Perhaps in arguments that improved
public transport and improved local
services would ensure low car shares and
car use to suburban housing and
workplaces
Perhaps in arguments that improved
public transport and good access to local
services alone would ensure low car
shares and car use to suburban housing
and workplaces
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Trafﬁc-increasing measures and strategies were introduced in
planning processes mainly as responses to other objectives or
needs, more or less clearly stated in the planning documents.
Examples of such objectives are to facilitate for population growth,
to drain trafﬁc from the city centre and housing areas, to meet
mobility needs and to make the city more attractive. In our cases,
the responses were suggestions for trafﬁc-increasing measures and
strategies, in particular urban road capacity increases and land-use
expansions in non-central locations on new land. Hence, one way
of explaining how and why trafﬁc-increasing measures were
included in the plans was that the objective ‘reducing trafﬁc
volumes’ was ousted by competing objectives.
As discussed in Section 4, planners can meet seemingly
competing objectives in ways other than by including trafﬁc-
increasing measures. As a minimum, they could ensure that
political decision-makers are aware that including certain
measures compromises the goal achievement potential of the
plans. The impact assessments of the planning proposals in the
three cases could be understood as examples of planners using the
expert knowledge to explain how and why inclusion of certain
measures and strategies could reduce the goal achievement
potential of plans. Assessments of the Trondheim Package
demonstrated that the proposed measures, implemented with
the assumed strength, would not ensure goal achievement. Impact
assessments for the Aarhus and Lund master plans showed that
implementing the proposed plans would contribute to increased,
rather that reduced, trafﬁc volumes and GHG emissions. Hence,
one could argue that planners did warn political decision-makers
that certain measures and strategies would reduce the goal-
achievement potentials of the plans.
The impact assessments, however, were conducted after the
planning processes had got to the planning proposal stage. One can
readily understand how this kind of knowledge may be unwel-
come at this stage. Responding to it would, at least in the Lund and
Aarhus cases, mean developing entirely new strategies and
concepts for overall urban development. Surely the plans could
have been amended; for instance, by removing road expansion
projects, applying stricter parking restrictions, or removing
development sites furthest from the city centre. As discussed in
Section 4.2, proposed plans are normally the results of long-termprocesses involving negotiations between numerous and different
stakeholders with different objectives, knowledge and powers.
Including or removing bits and parts after the actors have agreed
on a plan can often be hard. Proposing totally new strategies or
concepts is normally not an option.
What could contribute to plans with higher goal achievement
potential is planners bringing insights from the expert knowledge
in question into the deliberation on ongoing plan-making
processes. The planners could use the expert knowledge as a
basis for explaining why certain measures and strategies are
counter-productive with respect to prominent objectives (such as
reducing trafﬁc volumes and GHG emissions), for arguing that
these should not be included in the planning processes, and for
introducing alternative solutions contributing to the achievement
of multiple objectives, including trafﬁc reductions. We found few,
if any, examples of planners doing so in our cases (Table 6).
Understanding why this is the case may be a key to
understanding how and why measures and strategies counter-
acting goal achievement are included in plans. As discussed in
Sections 3 and 4.3, this could be due to properties of the expert
knowledge. In the Trondheim case, planners explained that effects
of measures were context-dependent, and empirical evidence
concerning effects of measures is not available for all combinations
in all contexts. Furthermore, good methods for ex-ante assess-
ments of combinations of measures are lacking. Hence, the
planners could claim that effects of the particular combination
of measures in the particular context were uncertain. This allowed
planners to disregard the expert knowledge in question when it did
not ﬁt the current political agenda. In the Aarhus and Lund cases,
planners expressed knowledge claims concerning effects of new
town developments located fairly distant from the city centre that
were more in line with outdated knowledge or planning myths
than with state-of-the-art expert knowledge. There were few, if
any, references to the trafﬁc-inducing effects of increased road
capacity in the Lund and Aarhus cases.
However, the above examples cannot necessarily be explained
by properties of the expert knowledge, since the theoretical and
empirical knowledge concerning trafﬁc-increasing effects of
expanding road capacity in urban transport systems under
pressure, as well as of urban developments at the urban fringes,
are among the better documented issues in planning theory
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referring to other research-based knowledge demonstrating that
the assumed (in Section 3) trafﬁc-increasing measures would not
in fact have such an effect.
Other explanations could be related to properties of the
planners and their practices. Planners may be unable to bring
the expert knowledge in question into planning processes because,
for various reasons, they do not know it well enough to understand
or explain the trafﬁc-increasing effects of suggested measures. This
could be part of the explanation in the Lund and Aarhus cases,
where the planners seemed to rely on planning myths concerning
the effects of spatial structure rather than on research-based
knowledge. In Trondheim, on the other hand, several planners
expressed that they knew very well that un-central urban
developments and increased road capacity counteract the main
objectives of the Trondheim Package. As for the land-use strategy,
planners at the planning authorities believed they could have
achieved more if they had been more pro-active in facilitating the
densiﬁcation strategy they considered necessary to achieve the
deﬁned goals. When explaining why they included the road
projects, the planners said that the political decision-makers saw
these as a necessary part of the package and would not be
persuaded to apportion priority differently. Instead they did what
they could to reach agreement on the best Trondheim Package
possible within the existing frames, and to ﬁnd ways of mitigating
negative effects. Likewise, the planners in Aarhus did not speak up
about the parking restrictions they saw as necessary to achieve the
deﬁned objectives, since they believed the political decision-
makers were not yet ready for car-restrictive measures. These are
examples of planners exercising self-censorship. They possess the
knowledge that certain measures counteract stated main objec-
tives but, it seems, decide not to use it or to make political decision-
makers aware of it. These ﬁndings illustrate that the power
relations between planners and political decision-makers may be
important explanations when planners include trafﬁc-increasing
measures in plans.
The Aarhus case illustrates another interesting explanation,
namely the power of a compelling project or idea. The origin of the
plan was an idea about a rail-based public transport system in the
city. This grew into the idea of combining new town developments
with a light rail project, which planners and political decision-
makers alike agreed on, and which resulted in the 2009 Master
Plan. Taking the expert knowledge in question into account would
be threatening to this idea. Likewise, questioning the road projects
in the Trondheim Package could stop the plan from being
implemented, according to the planners. These could be examples
of research-based knowledge being threatening to political
agendas, and hence disregarded or ousted (Owens et al., 2006).
Our readings of planning documents revealed that planners do
not necessarily explain the cause–effect relations on which their
knowledge claims are based. Furthermore, we found that they
rarely present references to documented knowledge underpinning
their knowledge claims or recommendations. We ﬁnd that thisTable 7
Assessment of whether and how the use and non-use of the expert knowledge affecte
Trondheim Lund 
Yes, use of the expert knowledge in question was
fundamental for coordinating land-use and
transport developments, and for selecting trafﬁc-
reducing measures. Planners exercised self-
censorship when they found that the expert
knowledge contradicted political agendas, and
they did not speak up against counter-productive
measures (road capacity expansions, land-use
development strategies)
Yes, use of the expert knowl
fundamental for coordinating
developments, and for selec
measures. The knowledge w
myths concerning land-use 
regarded when considering rpractice is part of the explanation why trafﬁc-increasing land-use
and transport system developments are included in plans aiming
at reducing trafﬁc volumes and GHG emissions. It opens for
confusing un-documented myth, beliefs and wishes with docu-
mented knowledge. It also opens for planners selecting which
knowledge claims to present. It absolves planners from reading up
on documented knowledge concerning the case matters in the
plans. It reduces the transparency of plans, analyses and planning
debates, and hinders open and knowledge-based planning debates.
It paves the way for political decision-makers affecting profes-
sional analyses and recommendations in ways not fostering
knowledge-based analyses, plans and decisions. If planners in
our cases were required to document their knowledge claims and
recommendations, they could not have presented these plans as
responses to objectives concerning reduction of trafﬁc volumes
and GHG emissions.
The reasoning in this section demonstrates that when explain-
ing how and why measures and strategies counteracting goal
achievement with respect to reducing trafﬁc volumes are included
in plans, several interrelated mechanisms need to be included.
Main explanations are related to ousting of the objective ‘reducing
trafﬁc volumes’, and to planners not knowing (well) or not using
the expert knowledge in question.
5.5.4. Whether and how the use and non-use of expert knowledge
affect the goal achievement potential of the plans
The above analyses show that whether or not planners use the
expert knowledge in question in planning processes, and how they
use it, indeed affects the goal achievement potential of plans.
This expert knowledge is a main basis for knowing and acting of
many planners (Table 7). It affects their framing of problems as well
as which measures they consider in ways fundamental to the
coordination of land-use and transport planning and for inclusion of
trafﬁc-reducing measures. The planners use this expert knowledge
to explain cause–effect relations and as arguments as to why some
measures increase goal achievement potential, while others do not.
We also found that the ways planners use the expert knowledge
in question, as well as their non-use of it, are important parts of the
explanation as to how and why measures reducing goal
achievement potential were included in the plans. When compet-
ing objectives, understandings or ideas seemingly call for trafﬁc-
increasing measures, the public planners did not use the expert
knowledge in question to explain that the proposed measures
reduced the goal achievement potential of the plans or for ﬁnd
alternatives that would improve it. This was explained in different
ways. Certain characteristics of the expert knowledge could
explain why it was disregarded in some situations. The main
explanations were, however were related to the planners and their
practices. Some planners do not know state-of-the-art knowledge
in this ﬁeld, or they rely on obsolete planning paradigms and
planning myths. They are therefore unable to bring this knowledge
into the planning processes. Some planners choose to disregard it
when it opposes a compelling planning idea. Others knew thed the goal achievement potential of the plans in Trondheim, Lund and Aarhus.
Aarhus
edge in question was
 land-use and transport
ting trafﬁc-reducing
as ousted by planning
developments, and not
oad capacity expansions
Yes, use of the expert knowledge in question was
fundamental for coordinating land-use and transport
developments, and for selecting trafﬁc-reducing
measures. The knowledge was ousted by planning
myths concerning land-use developments,
disregarded when it opposed a compelling idea, and
not regarded when considering restrictive measures
and road capacity expansions
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chose not to bring the knowledge into planning processes because
they did not believe they could convince the political decision-
makers to include or exclude certain measures and strategies. An
important prerequisite for this is the practice of not clearly
substantiating or presenting references to documented knowledge
for important knowledge claims in plans and analyses.
6. Discussion
6.1. Interesting contradictions
When asking whether and how planners’ use and non-use of the
expert knowledge in question affect the contents of plans and their
goal achievement potential, there is an interesting contradiction in
the ﬁndings in our cases. On the one hand, we found that the idea of
coordinating land-use and transport systems development in ways
contributing to reducing trafﬁc volumes is prominent in urban
planning practice. This is stated as a high priority objective in all
examined planning and policy documents. Widespread agreement
on how land-use and transport systems ought to be developed in
order to contribute to achieving this (listed as three bullet points
in Section 3) is also found in planning documents and interviews
with planning practitioners. Planners use this knowledge for
understanding, explaining and arguing how and why coordinating
land-use and transport systems development are necessary, and
how and why certain measures and strategies contribute to reducing
transport demand and trafﬁc volumes and should be included in the
plans. Hence, this could be interpreted as a success story where
research-based knowledge has diffused to wide parts of planning
practice, and where it is used in plan-making in ways contributing to
increasing the goal achievement potential of the plans.
On the other hand, however, we found that planners include
counteracting measures in plans, which reduces their goal
achievement potential. When competing objectives seem to call
for trafﬁc-increasing measures, planners do not use the expert
knowledge in explaining how these measures reduce the goal
achievement potential of plans, and they do not turn to research-
based sources of knowledge for help in solving their planning
problems. In this process, planners disregard or oust the expert
knowledge in question. We found three main explanations for this
in our cases. One was that planners do not know this knowledge
well, and/or they rely on previous planning paradigms and
planning myths. Another was that planners more or less
consciously disregard this knowledge when it does not ﬁt their
planning agenda or a compelling idea. The third was that planners
exercise self-censorship when they ﬁnd that this knowledge
contradicts political agendas or objectives.
6.2. Exploring potential explanations
In order to answer our second research question about what can
be done to improve the goal achievement potential of plans, we
need to explore different ways of understanding and explaining the
ﬁndings in our cases. Our discussions concern mainly how and why
strategies and measures reducing goal achievement potential are
included in plans. Here are four hypotheses or potential explana-
tions that are interrelated in several ways:
 The ways planners gain knowledge affects how they use or
ignore expert knowledge when making plans.
 The ways planners use or ignore expert knowledge when making
plans – their practice – cause that counter-productive measures
are included in plans.
 Characteristics of the expert knowledge cause planners either
not to use it or to use it wrongly. The distribution and exertion of power in planning processes
prevents planners from using the expert knowledge when
making plans.
6.2.1. The ways planners gain knowledge
The ﬁrst potential explanation is that the way planners gain
knowledge affects how they use it when making plans, and hence
the content of the plans. Analyses of the three cases revealed that
the main mechanism through which the expert knowledge in
question was introduced in planning processes was as embedded
in knowledgeable planners involved. The interviews demonstrated
that planners form a community of practice (Wenger, 1998), where
learning from experience and from other planning practitioners
are important ways of gaining knowledge after their education.
This includes reading local, regional, national and sometimes
international planning and policy documents. Knowledge diffuses
(Shipan & Volden, 2008) between planners working together in the
same city, and between planners in different cities and countries.
Knowledge creep (Radaelli, 1995) and enlightenment (Weiss,
1979) are important mechanisms through which new knowledge
reaches planning practice. There are indications that knowledge
transfer also occurs through direct contact between academic
milieus and planning practice in planning processes and at
seminars and conferences. From our cases, it seems that planners’
reading of scientiﬁc or popular science literature is not an
important mechanism for knowledge transfer from research to
practice. This is in accordance with ﬁndings in previous studies
(Krizek et al., 2009; Owens et al., 2006; Tennøy, 2012).
Learning through communities of practice is a natural and
logical way of transferring knowledge between planners with
different competence and between more and less experienced
planners. Knowledge diffusion like this could also have disadvan-
tages. For instance, there is little room for contact with research-
based knowledge and there are time-lags between production and
use of research-based knowledge. It opens for faulty translations,
misunderstandings and over-simpliﬁcations, as well as vulnera-
bility for confusion of documented and non-documented knowl-
edge. Furthermore, knowledge diffusion offers few opportunities
or possibilities for critical discussions and corrections.
An important mechanism through which research-based
knowledge transfers to planning practice is through education.
This involves a substantial time-lag from the point at which
research produces knowledge until the students become inﬂuen-
tial planners contributing to setting the agenda in planning
processes. Furthermore, fresh planners will be (and should be)
inﬂuenced by the knowledge, understanding and framing of more
experienced planners. This opens, however, for outdated knowl-
edge and old planning myths living alongside and being confused
with state-of-the-art research-based knowledge. Another entry
point for research-based knowledge is researchers contributing in
planning processes, or at seminars and conferences aimed at
planning practitioners. This allows a more direct transfer of
research-based knowledge if researchers contribute with relevant
and useful knowledge for planning practice, and present it in ways
that are understandable and useable by planning practitioners. If
they do, planners still need to interpret this knowledge to ﬁt the
physical and political contexts in which they work, and to explain
it to other planners and decision-makers; otherwise the knowl-
edge will not become inﬂuential in planning processes. If planners
do not turn to scientiﬁc or popular science written sources for
conﬁrmation, the knowledge transfer is vulnerable for misinter-
pretations, over-simpliﬁcations, and confusion of myths and un-
documented knowledge with research-based knowledge.
These are explanations of how and why some planners do not
know state-of-the-art expert knowledge concerning the case
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on obsolete knowledge, un-documented knowledge or planning
myths rather than on documented research-based knowledge
when making plans.
6.2.2. The ways planners use or ignore expert knowledge when
making plans
Through the case studies, we learned that the ways planners use
or ignore expert knowledge clearly inﬂuence the content and goal
achievement potential of plans. We also learned that the most
important mechanism through which the expert knowledge in
question is used and inﬂuences the content of plans is as being the
basis for knowing and acting of planners involved. This knowledge
is an important part of planners’ framing, described by Scho¨n
(1983) as a way of selecting, organizing, interpreting and making
sense of a complex reality to provide guideposts for knowing,
analysing, persuading and acting. Their framing inﬂuences how
planners understand problems, which measures and strategies
they consider, which analyses and tools they use, etc. (as discussed
in Section 4.2).
This could also mean that planners use this knowledge rather
subconsciously for understanding problems and possible solu-
tions. This may work well for experienced planners dealing with
familiar problems, solutions and contexts. Problems occur, it may
seem from our cases, when planners face new objectives and
challenges, such as making plans contributing to reduced trafﬁc
volumes, or when they ﬁnd unfamiliar conﬂicts of objectives in
planning processes. If they do not turn to relevant, documented,
research-based knowledge in solving their planning problems in
such cases, but rather rely on their embedded knowledge and what
others have done before them, they may not be able to ﬁnd
innovative ways of meeting new challenges contributing to
achieving seemingly contradictory objectives. If they instead turn
to out-dated knowledge not relevant for the objectives and context
in hand, to un-documented planning myths (see Næss et al., 2013)
or to old solutions that worked well for other problems and
objectives, they are likely to produce plans with low goal
achievement potential.
This problem is aggravated by a culture where planning
practitioners are not required to clearly state the cause–effect
relations on which they build their analyses and plans, where
references for important knowledge claims are rarely presented or
asked for, and where research-based empirical evidence is seldom
displayed. This results in a lack of clarity and transparency in plans
and planning analyses which makes critical discussion almost
impossible. Others cannot test or verify their knowledge claims,
make up their own minds or dispute the validity of the claims in
the actual context. This, too, makes distinguishing between well-
documented knowledge claims and analyses from planning myths
and undocumented knowledge difﬁcult, and may reduce the
inﬂuence of research-based knowledge. Furthermore, it does not
require planners to read up on documented knowledge relevant to
the planning task.
In our cases, planners used the expert knowledge in question
more actively and consciously when assessing whether the
proposed measures and strategies in a plan would contribute to
goal achievement. As discussed in Section 5.5, impact assessments
are normally conducted after the actors have agreed on a plan.
Making major changes at this stage will often not be an option. If
the knowledge is to have substantial inﬂuence on the content and
goal achievement of a plan, planners need to bring expert
knowledge into the plan-making process. They need to use it
when describing the problems to hand, their causes and the causal
relations between land-use and transport systems development
and trafﬁc volumes. Furthermore, they need to address how
mechanisms contributing to reducing trafﬁc volumes can betriggered and how mechanisms contributing to increasing trafﬁc
volumes can be hampered, how to mitigate problems that may
occur if the necessary strategies and measures are implemented,
etc. In our cases, we found little evidence that planners did so.
Professional planners are supposed to be the primary knowl-
edge carriers in complex plan-making processes, and the ones that
bring relevant, up-to-date, knowledge into planning processes.
This is a prerequisite for production of plans with high goal
achievement potential. We have already described how planners
gain knowledge through communities of practice, with the risk of
substantial time-lags, faulty translations, and confusion between
documented and non-documented knowledge; also, that planners
use this knowledge in subconscious ways, and without stating the
bases and references for their knowledge claims. Lastly, it seems
that planners tend not to turn to research-based state-of-the-art
knowledge to solve complex and unfamiliar planning problems.
Together, this could explain why planners include trafﬁc-increas-
ing measures and strategies in plans aiming at reducing trafﬁc
volumes. This could severely hamper transitions towards land-use
and transport developments fostering more sustainable mobility
patterns.
6.2.3. Characteristics of the expert knowledge
Characteristics of the expert knowledge itself were suggested as
a possible explanation as to how and why counter-productive
measures are included in plans (Section 4.3). Our case studies
revealed that some planners ﬁnd that the expert knowledge does
not present precise and unquestionable answers to their planning
problems. As a response, researchers could point at the over-
whelming empirical evidence of the trafﬁc-increasing effects of
urban sprawl and urban road capacity expansion. This throws up
interesting questions concerning whether and why researchers
and practitioners have different points of view with respect to
what it takes for research-based knowledge to be usable in
practice.
These ﬁndings may also be understood as a demonstration of
the asymmetric burden of evidence (Næss, 2011a). The require-
ments are far stronger when it comes to controversial questions,
such as when knowledge challenges current framings or compel-
ling ideas. That said, we agree that theoretical understandings and
empirical evidence concerning certain forms of polycentric urban
developments (e.g. location of non-specialised jobs in suburban or
exurban centres) need to be further developed. This could
contribute to better and more knowledge-based planning analyses
concerning how spatial urban development affects travel behav-
iour and trafﬁc volumes. This could also be a valid critique when it
comes to other issues and case matters in planning, such as the
effects of various improvements in public transport services
(frequency, speed, walking distances) on car-use in various
contexts.
Another problem that planners face when using research
literature when making plans is that it may be hard to judge
which research to rely on. Researchers focus on different aspects
of for instance the characteristics of spatial structure (such as
centrality of housing, density in demarcated residential areas,
street layout), and they may disagree on which aspects matter
more for trafﬁc volumes generated per capita. This may be part of
the explanation why planners in two of our cases saw large, new
urban, development fairly distant from the city centre as
unproblematic strategies in land-use and transport plans aiming
at reducing trafﬁc volumes. It also allows planners to select
research ﬁndings ﬁtting their agenda or project, and for disputes
between planners basing their knowledge claims on different
research ﬁndings.
In Section 4.3 we opened for the possibility of competing
scientiﬁc knowledge to the state-of-the-art knowledge presented
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in question. We have not found references to such competing,
documented knowledge in our cases.
A relevant characteristic of the expert knowledge concerns how
accessible it is for planning practitioners. Traditionally, much
academic knowledge is hidden behind journal paywalls. Planning
practitioners may not be familiar with the journal system, or their
employers may not want to pay for access to journal articles. This
situation may improve as more researchers publish their academic
works as open access – free and searchable on the Internet. Planners
may still lack the resources to seek out, sort, read and translate
research literature in their own context. The interviewees in our
cases did not report that they had been prevented from reading up
on research literature in any way. Rather, our impression is that they
had not considered this as a relevant option.
We agree with Krizek et al. (2009), who suggest that good
research summaries could help in the communication of research
ﬁndings to the planning practitioner, but ﬁnd that they are often
lacking. Two planners in our cases referred to such summaries,
while no one referred to journal articles. Our own searches for
research summaries concerning various issues revealed that they
are often more concerned with planning processes than with
effects of physical developments, that they present more norma-
tive opinions, assumptions and beliefs, and less documented
knowledge concerning effects of certain measures in speciﬁc
contexts. This was the case, for instance, when we searched for
summaries of documented effects of parking regulations on retail
in city centres. Litman’s (2013) summaries are good examples of
research evidence concerning induced trafﬁc.
6.2.4. Distribution and exertion of power in planning processes
As discussed in Sections 1.3, 4.2 and 4.3, the distribution of
power in planning processes, and how different actors exert the
powers they possess, may strongly affect whether and how
planners use relevant expert knowledge, which knowledge
becomes inﬂuential, and hence the contents and goal achievement
potential of plans. Our discussions on power in this article focus on
these aspects.
Lukes’ (2005) three dimensions of power are relevant when
analysing planning processes. He orders power as: direct power,
exercised in order to win in more or less open conﬂicts; agenda-
setting power, exercised for affecting which issues are made
prominent; and structural power, related to latent or not openly
expressed conﬂicts, and which inﬂuence and shape perceptions,
cognitions and preferences in such a way that actors accept their
role in the existing order of things. We also ﬁnd Bachrach and
Baratz’s (1962) deﬁnitions of ﬁve different ways of exerting power
useful: Coercion, inﬂuence, authority, force and manipulation.
We did not ﬁnd evidence of actors exerting direct power in open
conﬂicts in ways affecting whether and how planners use the
expert knowledge in question in our cases. Neither did we see
examples of planners or others using expert knowledge as tools in
order to win in open conﬂicts. This is partly explained by our cases
being strategic planning processes, since they are led by and
mainly involve public authorities. If studying zoning plan
processes, we would probably have found clearer examples of
open conﬂicts, knowledge battles and power-play between
planning authorities and developers, as did Tennøy (2012) for
instance when analysing four zoning plan processes. It is also
partly explained by our focus on planners and their use of
knowledge. We know for instance that the political right and left
wings in Trondheim disagreed on re-introduction of the toll
cordon. Since the left wing was in power, the right wing respected
the authority of the left to make the decision. We assume that there
had been some political power-play before the decision was made,
but this was outside the scope of our research. On these terms, wedid not ﬁnd open conﬂicts concerning the planning proposals or
which measures should be included in or excluded from the plans.
In particular, we did not ﬁnd planners exerting their powers as
knowledge carriers opposing inclusion of trafﬁc-increasing mea-
sures, and we did not ﬁnd conﬂicts between different planners
using knowledge as tools for convincing the other side. Planners
and consultants used their inﬂuence as professionals and as
knowledge carriers to explain in the impact assessments that the
plans would not contribute to (Aarhus and Lund) or ensure
(Trondheim) goal achievement. Planners presenting professional
analyses in these ways can only to a certain degree be understood
as actors exerting their power to win in open conﬂicts.
In strategic planning processes, as studied here, the exertion of
agenda-setting power stands out. In planning terms, we can
interpret this as exerting power to deﬁne main objectives. As
discussed throughout the analyses, there are conﬂicting agendas in
all three cases. In all cases, sustainable urban development and the
need to curb trafﬁc growth is one agenda, or objective. This is an
important explanation as to why planning of land-use and
transport systems developments is coordinated, and why trafﬁc-
reducing measures are included in the plans. In all cases, there are
also other agendas or objectives, seemingly conﬂicting with the
agenda concerning reducing trafﬁc volumes and GHG emissions.
This is an important part of the explanation as to how and why
trafﬁc-increasing measures are included in the plans.
Planners were important agenda-setters in all cases and in
different ways. In Trondheim, they used the municipal transport
plan to move trafﬁc and environment higher up on the agenda by
describing a grim future without certain decisions and actions (re-
introducing the toll cordon, facilitating use of other modes of
mobility than car, steering land-use developments towards
densiﬁcation). Political decision-makers in power strengthened
this agenda by making and adopting the Trondheim Package. They
made reducing or curbing trafﬁc volumes in order to reduce GHG
emissions an important agenda, but in a way where expansion of
urban road capacity was a prerequisite. Planners made politicians
aware that this could threaten the agenda concerning reducing
trafﬁc volumes, and hence paved the way for capacity reductions
on other roads.
In Aarhus, one planner worked for several years to get light rail
put on the planning agenda in the city, and succeeded (a
forthcoming article in the same project presents the planner’s
own story about this project) partly because his agenda seemed to
coincide with an emerging political agenda concerning reduction
of GHG emissions from trafﬁc in the growing city. Interestingly,
through continuous dialogue with academic milieus, Aarhus
planners became more aware of the trafﬁc-increasing effects of
new towns. In the revised plan, the most trafﬁc-generating new
towns are postponed to an undeﬁned future. This could be
understood as academics using their authority as knowledge
carriers to affect the planning agenda.
In the Lund case, it seems that planners working for the planning
authorities used their agenda-setting power the way it is normally
used, that is by interpreting many of the objectives deﬁned by
political decision-makers and making a planning proposal. Making
the plans (writing, drawing, calculating) could be understood as
planners’ strongest exertion of agenda-setting power.
Despite these examples of planners and decision-makers
exerting power in deﬁning agendas, we did not ﬁnd examples of
open conﬂicts concerning agenda-setting, or that actors strongly
(stronger than one would expect) and openly exerted their power
to render one agenda more prominent than another. This could be
explained by Lukes’ structural power being dominant. According to
Powell and DiMaggio (1991), institutions inﬂuence human
behaviour through rules, norms and cognitive structures. Actors
take action through a logic of appropriateness based on what is
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(March & Olsen, 1989). In planning processes, the Planning and
Building Act deﬁnes the rules of the game. The actors involved have
pre-deﬁned understandings of the order of things, including who is
in power over which decisions. In this system, planners are
supposed to advise political decision-makers, but not openly
oppose political signals or decisions. This can explain why
Trondheim planners exercised self-censorship concerning effects
of road capacity expansions, and why Aarhus planners did not
suggest stricter parking restrictions.
If planners experience decision-making bodies not really caring
much about some of the objectives affected by the planned
solutions, they may ﬁnd it necessary not to align their proposals
with these objectives. Planning theorists such as Lindblom (1959)
have advised against elucidating solution alternatives and impact
categories unlikely to be emphasised by the decision-makers. If the
planners adhere to this way of thinking, it might appear rational to
direct the search for solutions backed by sufﬁcient power.
Controversial solutions that might lead to delays in the deci-
sion-making process, or even set implementation of the plan at
risk, are then likely to be ousted. This seems to have occurred in all
three case cities. Our ﬁndings hence illustrate that power relations
between planners and political decision-makers may be important
explanations when planners include trafﬁc-increasing measures in
plans.
This does not mean that planners can blame plans with low goal
achievement potential on political decision-makers, or that
planners’ use and non-use of expert knowledge cannot or do
not affect the content and goal achievement potential of plans.
Planners are inﬂuential and have much room for manoeuvre in
planning processes, as our case studies have demonstrated. There
is also much unused space for planners exerting power in ways
contributing to plans with higher goal achievement potential. The
largest may be that planners use their powers and abilities as
knowledge carriers and professionals to develop planning alter-
natives contributing to reduce trafﬁc volumes, and at the same
time to achieve other objectives high on the political agenda
(enough housing, attractive cities, reduced local environmental
problems, etc.).
6.3. What can be done to improve the goal achievement potential of
plans?
What, then, would be necessary to improve the goal achieve-
ment potential of plans? When focusing on planners’ use and non-
use of expert knowledge when making plans, within the
framework of existing legislations we develop answers focusing
on what planning practitioners and planning researchers can do
differently from today. The practitioners are the ones using or not
using expert knowledge when making plans with high or low goal
achievement potential, while the researchers are the ones produce
and disseminating the expert knowledge (as deﬁned here). Our
answers are interrelated and partly overlapping.
6.3.1. What planning practitioners and the planning profession can do
As far as planning practitioners are concerned, their producing
plans with higher goal achievement potential with respect to
reduced urban trafﬁc volumes would require, ﬁrst, that they make
this a more prominent objective throughout the plan-making
process. The planners need to approach planning processes
conﬁdent that their plans will contribute to reducing trafﬁc
volumes. They also need to get this objective high up on the agenda
among the planners involved and among the political decision-
makers who may be required to make unpopular decisions. If not,
the chances are high that the objective is ousted by other
objectives during the planning and decision-making process, andthat the process produces a plan with low goal-achievement
potential.
Second, planners need to make a real effort towards ﬁnding
ways of solving challenging planning problems and of meeting
seemingly conﬂicting objectives in ways contributing to reducing
transport demands and trafﬁc volumes. Doing so requires that
planners meet this task through innovative thinking, curiosity and
hard work. Reducing trafﬁc volumes, improving transport quality,
facilitating city growth, and developing a more attractive city are
not necessarily conﬂicting objectives. The expert knowledge in
question offers ways of meeting all these objectives simultaneous-
ly. Rather than relying on undocumented knowledge and previous
experience, if planners turn to the expert knowledge in question
their chances of ﬁnding innovative ways of solving new and
challenging planning problems would probably increase substan-
tially, and allow them to develop planning alternatives meeting
different objectives without compromising reduced trafﬁc
volumes and more sustainable urban mobility. Our cases
demonstrated that planners do not necessarily do these things.
Our third point is therefore that planners need to turn more
actively to documented and research-based knowledge when
struggling with difﬁcult planning problems and seemingly
conﬂicting objectives.
Fourth, this, too, means that planning practitioners need to be
more critical of their own plans and ideas, as well as of their tacit
and embedded knowledge. As discussed above, the ways planners
gain knowledge through their community of practice can result in
misinterpretation, over-simpliﬁcation, and for confusion between
undocumented knowledge and research-based knowledge. This
problem can be reduced if planners are aware of it and act to ensure
that they lean on well-founded knowledge claims when making
plans and analyses.
This takes us to our ﬁfth point; namely, that planning
practitioners need: to present clearer descriptions of the under-
standings of cause–effect relations on which they build their
analyses and planning proposals; to give references for their
knowledge claims; and to present empirical evidence where
available. This would call for clear thinking and allow for critical
reﬂections and discussions, which could then open for innovation
leading to plans with higher goal achievement potential. It would
also require planners to read up on the relevant literature and be
more capable of distinguishing between valid and less valid
knowledge.
This calls for a sixth change; namely, how planning practitioners
understand and exercise their role and power as knowledge
carriers and decision-makers’ main advisors. We suggested above
that planners do not fully use the power they have to set new
agendas, that is, in their capacity to develop planning alternatives
contributing to reduce trafﬁc volumes, and at the same time
achieving other objectives given priority. If they instead exercise
self-censorship of the knowledge they possess, disregard vital
knowledge opposing compelling ideas or do not seek updated
knowledge on unfamiliar case matters, they do not contribute to
enlightenment of fellow planners and decision-makers with
respect to the consequences of decisions or to alternative ways
of solving problems. How they actually can and do act, relates to
the properties of the planners themselves. This has to do with how
competent, skilled and experienced they are in regard to the
challenges and case matters at hand, and how determined and
curious they are about ﬁnding good ways of solving challenging
problems contributing to reducing trafﬁc volumes. It also depends
on the context they operate in, such as whether decision-makers
are willing to listen to planners’ advice, and whether their planning
community is open to innovative thinking and new ideas.
Changes in how planning practitioners operate are not just a
task for the individual planner, they are also to a high degree a
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above call for the planning community seriously to discuss their
practice and to reﬂect on changes that could contribute to making
the profession, as well as the individual planner, better able to
develop land-use and transport strategies contributing to more
sustainable urban development. We do not discuss this at any
length here, but just suggest some relevant issues. One is the
education of planners. This concerns whether and how they are
trained in strategic land-use and transport planning. It is also about
whether and how they are trained to seek out research-based
knowledge, to state the cause–effect relations underpinning their
knowledge claims, planning proposals and recommendations, and
to make references to research-based knowledge in plans and
analyses. Another issue concerns post-university courses and
continuing professional training. The Scandinavian countries have
no organisation resembling for instance the UK Royal Town
Planning Institute (RTPI), which offers membership to accredited
planners and courses qualifying for membership. The ﬁndings in
this study indicate that the Scandinavian countries could beneﬁt
from an organisation resembling the UK Royal Town Planning
Institute, which organises and trains planners and sets the
standards for what is required by someone denoting themselves
as planners.
6.3.2. What planning researchers can do
When discussing what can be done to improve the goal
achievement potential of plans, focusing on planners’ use and non-
use of expert knowledge, we also need to discuss how researchers
producing this expert knowledge can contribute. Our discussion is
based on ﬁndings concerning how planners gain knowledge, how it
is introduced in planning processes, how and why planners use or
ignore such knowledge when making plans, and how it all affects
the content and goal achievement potential of plans.
One issue is the kinds of knowledge planning research
produces. As discussed in the Introduction, several authors claim
that planning research has not given much attention to what we
have termed expert knowledge – substantive evidence concerning
how cities function. As a consequence, planners aiming at making
their plans and analyses more knowledge-based may not ﬁnd
research-based knowledge valid in the concrete context concern-
ing the case matters they struggle with. Based on our own
experience when making planning analyses of various issues for
cities of varying size, we know that relevant research-based
knowledge can be hard to ﬁnd. Often, we need to rely on
knowledge that may not be valid in the concrete context. One task
for planning research is hence to produce evidence concerning the
effects of different kinds of development on trafﬁc volumes,
attractiveness, transport quality, etc., and thus contribute to
strengthening the expert knowledge planners need to make plans
with high goal achievement potential.
Another issue is how researchers disseminate and communi-
cate the knowledge they possess and produce to planning practice.
We have learned that planners gain knowledge through their
community of practice, that knowledge is brought into planning
processes mainly as embedded in the planners, and that planners
use the expert knowledge subconsciously when making plans.
They do not turn to journal articles for help in solving their
planning problems. How, then, can researchers communicate
knowledge into planning practice? Our case studies point out some
suggestions. Researchers can contribute with relevant articles in
popular science journals, and in seminars, conferences and courses
directed towards practitioners. Researchers can contribute in on-
going planning debates, through accepting invitations to work-
shops and meetings discussing these issues, in public discussions
in papers and open meetings, and by involving themselves in
concrete planning processes and analyses (this is probably morerelevant for researchers working at research institutes taking this
on as commissioned work than for university researchers).
How research-based knowledge is presented is crucial for its
usability by planning practitioners. Summaries of research-based
knowledge concerning speciﬁc topics (effects of land-use and
transport systems development on trafﬁc volumes in various
contexts, measures affecting the vitality and viability of city
centres, etc.) could be a way of increasing planning practitioners’
knowledge of state-of-the-art expert knowledge in various ﬁelds.
This requires that researchers take time to producing them while
making sure they are useful and usable for to planning practi-
tioners (for instance by involving practitioners in developing,
improving and disseminating them). This requires that the
summaries are relevant for planning practice, that the scientiﬁc
quality is good (for instance that there are full references for all
knowledge claims), and that the knowledge is presented in ways
that are easy to refer to and to translate into concrete contexts by
planners. Researchers and public authorities would often need to
promote such summaries if they are to be used in planning
practice.
This would require planning researchers to be more question-
ing about what kinds of knowledge planning practice needs, and
how planning practitioners assess and use the knowledge
produced by academics. Researchers could more actively and
empirically seek to ﬁgure out how and why planners produce plans
with low goal achievement potential, and how useful for plan-
making planners ﬁnd research-based knowledge. This might
involve deep studies of the ﬁne-grained processes through which
plans are made, as this paper attempts to do, and/or direct dialogue
with planning practice concerning their knowledge needs. Such
studies and dialogues could affect research agendas by revealing
knowledge needs as well as perceived or real shortcomings of the
knowledge that research could contribute to improving. It could
also contribute with new insights concerning what planning
practice requires with respect to the quality of the research-based
knowledge if it is to be usable. This might inspire some researchers
to change their research and dissemination strategies in ways that
provided planning practice with more useful and usable knowl-
edge. This in turn would be helpful to planners in producing more
knowledge-based analyses and plans with higher goal achieve-
ment potential.
Owens (2005:290–291) warns that researchers should not
necessarily adjust their research to practice, since ‘‘the research
that seems least useful, indeed even threatening, in the short term
might contribute most to substantial longer term change’’. We
agree, but ﬁnd that planning research should contribute to
knowledge and theories in, of, as well as about planning (Faludi,
1973; Friedmann, 2003), where knowledge in planning concerns
the substantive objects of planning. For instance, this could be how
land-use and transport system development affects trafﬁc
volumes.
7. Conclusions
In this paper we have investigated how planners’ use and non-
use of expert knowledge in plan-making affect the content and
goal-achievement potential of the plans. In addition, we have
examined what can be done to improve the latter. Our analysis
rests on three basic assumptions. One is that changes in the
physical environment affect aggregate-scale human behaviour in
relatively predictable ways. The second is that there can and does
exist research-based expert knowledge concerning these inter-
relations. The third is that research-based expert knowledge and
skilled planners applying this knowledge when making plans are
important prerequisites for producing plans with high goal
achievement potential.
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cerning how and why planners’ use and non-use of expert
knowledge when making plans affect the goal-achievement
potential of plans, and examined these through empirical case
studies of three strategic land-use and transport planning
processes. The expert knowledge in question in this work was
theoretical and empirical knowledge regarding how changes of
land-use and transport systems tend to affect travel behaviour and
trafﬁc volumes.
We found that whether or not planners use the expert
knowledge in question when making plans – and, if they do, how
they use it – indeed affects the goal achievement potential of the
plans they produce. This expert knowledge is a main basis for the
knowing and acting of many planners. It affects their framing of
problems, as well as which measures they consider and give
priority to, in ways being fundamental for coordination of land-
use and transport planning and for inclusion of trafﬁc-reducing
measures. The planners also use this expert knowledge to
explain cause–effect relations and as arguments why some
strategies and measures increase goal achievement potentials,
while others do not. We found that non-use of the expert
knowledge in question was an important part of the explanation
as to how and why measures reducing goal achievement
potential were included in the plans. When competing objec-
tives, understanding or ideas seemingly call for trafﬁc-increasing
measures, the planners did not use the expert knowledge in
question to explain that this reduced the goal achievement
potential of plans nor to ﬁnd alternatives that would improve it.
Some planners did not know state-of-the-art knowledge in this
ﬁeld well, or they relied on obsolete planning paradigms and
planning myths. Some planners choose to disregard this
knowledge when it opposes a compelling planning idea. Others
exercise self-censorship and choose not to bring the knowledge
into planning processes because they believe they cannot
persuade the political decision-makers to include or exclude
certain measures and strategies.
In the discussion section, we explored explanations relating to
how planners gain knowledge, how they use it, its characteristics
and the distribution and exertion of power in planning processes.
We found that the ways planners gain knowledge might explain
the confusion of valid with less valid knowledge. Furthermore, the
often subconscious ways planners use knowledge when making
plans, together with a culture in which they are not required to
clearly state the cause–effect relations on which they build their
analyses and plans, or to present references for their knowledge
claims, are parts of the explanation why they produce plans with
low goal achievement potential. We also found that properties of
the knowledge might make it less accessible and usable in
planning practice. Lastly, we found in particular that the structural
power in planning processes is part of the explanation as to why
planners sometimes exercise self-censorship and do not share
their expert knowledge with political decision-makers and others
in planning processes.
Based on these ﬁndings, we discussed what planning practi-
tioners and planning researchers can do to contribute to a higher
goal achievement potential of future plans. We argued that
planners would need to make reduction of trafﬁc volumes an even
more prominent objective, and strive to ﬁnd ways of solving
challenging planning problems that safeguarded this. This requires
them to be more critical of their own tacit knowledge, and to turn
more actively to research-based knowledge. Planning researchers
would need to strive towards producing the kind of expert
knowledge planners need in order to make plans with higher goal
achievement potential, and to present it in places where
practitioners ﬁnd themselves and in ways that are useful and
usable for them.The case studies in this paper were strategic land-use and
transport planning processes aiming at reducing urban trafﬁc
volumes and transport-related GHG emissions. For several
reasons we ﬁnd this issue highly relevant and interesting when
discussing the effects of planners’ use and non-use of expert
knowledge. Reducing trafﬁc volumes and GHG emissions from
transport come high on the agenda in many cities and countries.
Developing land-use and transport systems in directions contrib-
uting to this is a complex problem, and planners need to use
research-based expert knowledge in order to solve it in ways that
contribute to goal-achievement. Achieving this also requires
fundamental changes in framing and practice, which sometimes
cause clashes of knowledge in the planning processes. Finally,
processes concerning strategic and integrated land-use and
transport development are fairly complex too, with many actors
promoting different objectives and kinds of knowledge. Together,
this creates situations where the use and inﬂuence of research-
based expert knowledge are not necessarily obvious, and
therefore are interesting cases when investigating how planners’
use and non-use of expert knowledge affect goal achievement
potentials of plans.
One may ﬁnd, however, that many of the mechanisms
discussed here are relevant also when studying the use and
inﬂuence of research-based knowledge in planning processes
concerning other complex issues, where other types of expert
knowledge are more relevant, and maybe even within other
sectors and professions. Hence, we believe the analyses and
ﬁndings may be relevant beyond strategic land-use and transport
planning. Furthermore, we believe that the research and results
may be relevant for other countries and cities with similar
challenges and planning systems as the three Scandinavian cities
studied here.
In empirically investigating the issues in three overall planning
processes, this article contributes with new empirical insights on
the use and non-use of expert knowledge in planning, and on how
it inﬂuences the content and goal achievement potential of plans.
The research also contributes to our understanding how, exactly,
planners use expert knowledge when making plans, and how it is
brought into plan-making processes. Furthermore, the research
adds to the theoretical and empirical understanding of how
counter-productive measures with respect to stated objectives are
included in plans. This concerns among other things an enrichment
of our understanding of the ﬁne-grained processes through which
planning processes arrive at the strategies and measures included
in plans, and how expert knowledge is disregarded or ousted when
it does not ﬁt current agendas or tempting projects. Finally, the
paper contributes with recommendations concerning what
planning practitioners and planning researchers can do to improve
the goal achievement potential of plans. Our hope is that this
research has produced knowledge that will enable future planning
and policy-making to be successful in steering land-use and
transport developments towards more sustainable mobility
patterns, given here as reduced urban road trafﬁc volumes. We
also hope that the research will inspire other researchers to explore
the issue further.
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